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CAERT, B.P 141 Bureau Poste El-Mohammadia Alger, Algérie, Tel +213 21 52 01 10 Fax +213 21 52 03 78
Email : admin@caert.org.dz

ACSRT / CAERT

African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism

Terrorism

Bi-weekly Press Review

16 - 31 May 2016

Review no. 115



Press Review 16—31 May 2016

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Terrorism in Africa

How We're Fighting Conflict and Fragility Where Poverty is Deepest

05/23/2016



View from cave, Mali. © Curt Carnemark/World Bank

For the first time in history, the number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen below 10%. The world has never been as ambitious about development as it is today. After adopting the Sustainable Development Goals and signing the Paris climate deal at the end of 2015, the global community is now looking into the best and most effective ways of reaching these milestones. In this five-part series I will discuss what the World Bank Group is doing and what we are planning to do in key areas that are critical for ending poverty by 2030: [good governance](#), [gender equality](#), [conflict and fragility](#), creating jobs, and, finally, preventing and adapting to climate change.

By 2030, more than half of the world's poorest people will live in very poor countries that are fragile, affected by conflict, or experience high levels of violence

These are places where governments cannot adequately provide even basic services and security, where economic activity is paralyzed and where development is the most difficult. It is also where [poverty](#) is deepest. The problems these countries face don't respect borders. About half of the world's 20 million refugees are from poor countries. Many more are displaced within their own country.

Some countries have low levels of violence but get stuck in "fragility traps" where

the threat of violence results in stalled development. Countries such as [Central African Republic](#), [Mali](#), [Haiti](#), and [Sudan](#) have been in constant struggle with fragility over the past 20 years.

Conflict and fragility reverse hard-won development gains. It takes a high [economic toll](#) globally — about \$14.3 trillion in 2014, or 13.4 percent of the global economy. Conflict claims lives, uproots families and accounts for 80 percent of all humanitarian needs, according to the [United Nations](#).

Clearly, the world can't end extreme poverty without better tackling these challenges. Our work in 29 of the [world's poorest countries](#) is focused on finding and delivering solutions that have real impact.

Here are a few ways we are helping.

Addressing the drivers of fragility.

Violence is growing and becoming more complex. The number of ongoing conflicts increased to 50 in 2015, up from 41 a year earlier. Terrorist incidents are up 120 percent since 2012. It's increasingly critical to pinpoint the underlying causes of [fragility and violence](#) and try to defuse them.

The drivers of fragility include economic and regional disparities, uneven development, land-use conflicts, lack of transparency in natural resource governance, and lack of opportunity and jobs.

We're conducting "fragility assessments" in countries, along with economic and social analysis, to better address these issues.

For example, projects in the Great Lakes region of Africa are using best practices and lessons learned from what we've done in the [Democratic Republic of the Congo](#) and [Cote d'Ivoire](#) to address the prevalence of gender-based violence at regional border areas.

In the [Solomon Islands](#), the [Rapid Employment Project](#) hired 12,000 young people from vulnerable communities and created 664,000 days of employment to build infrastructure and support 1,200 small projects in the capital of Honiara

Our goal is to design programs tailored to address specific fragile situations, while strengthening government institutions so they become accountable, and also strengthening the ability of civil society to hold them accountable.

For example, we are helping Central African Republic rehire civil servants and rebuild public sector institutions following two years of political insecurity and the displacement of one quarter of the population.

Confronting forced displacement

We face an unprecedented crisis of forcibly displaced people in the world today, driven by conflict, war, and persecution. Almost half of refugees worldwide originate from [Syria](#), [Afghanistan](#), and [Somalia](#). Large numbers of refugees have also

fled Sudan, South Sudan, DRC, [Myanmar](#), [Iraq](#), and [Eritrea](#).

Forced displacement is increasingly seen as a global problem that needs long-term development solutions along with a humanitarian response. That's because humanitarian crises and displacement often last years.

We are assisting internally displaced people and refugee host communities in the Great Lakes, Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and the [Middle East](#). In the Central African Republic, we financed critical activities to address a food crisis and build food security in 2014, after a large number of people were internally displaced as a result of instability and violence. About 150,000 people benefited from the project that distributed 5,005 metric tons of food and increased seed production by 371 metric tons.

We'll work closely with countries and other partners to strengthen evidence-based dialogue and programming that helps alleviate the tremendous stress on displaced populations and host countries.

We will continue to develop and improve our investment and operating model, so we can respond timely and flexibly but also achieve lasting and effective results.

Partnering for impact

We're working with organizations such as the United Nations and the [European Union](#) to reach those who need help in fragile, low-income countries struggling with unstable political settlements, weak institutions and strained social contracts.

World Bank Group President [Jim Yong Kim](#) and UN Secretary-General [Ban Ki-moon](#) jointly travelled to the Great Lakes, the Sahel, Horn of Africa, and Middle East in the last three years to meet with leaders, seek solutions to development challenges, and a path to progress.

We also partner with the UN on analytical work to strengthen security and [justice](#) approaches, for example in [Liberia](#), where the Bank and UN worked also together to respond to the [Ebola](#) crisis and help the affected countries recover.

Partnerships with non-governmental organizations, the private sector and others have allowed us to make progress amid insecurity. In Afghanistan, 31 partners including the World Bank have supported [grassroots development](#) through more than 33,000 democratically elected community councils. The councils identified 86,000 small-scale projects to improve water supply and sanitation, rural roads, irrigation, power, health and education between 2003 and 2015. The program has generated over 52 million days of work for skilled and unskilled workers.

We cannot end extreme poverty without making progress in countries affected by fragility and violence. What will it take to break the fragility and conflict trap? We know that success will be much more likely if we stay involved, confront the drivers of conflict, and encourage accountable public institutions that can deliver security, justice, and jobs.

<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/>

Djihadisme en Afrique : le terrorisme oublié (2/2)

24 Mai 2016

D'après le [rapport](#) sur le terrorisme global de 2015 de l'Institut Paix et Economie, le nombre d'attaques et de victimes du terrorisme a "dramatiquement augmenté sur les quinze dernières années". Si leur nombre a considérablement accru depuis le début de la guerre civile syrienne en 2011 principalement au Moyen-Orient, le Nigéria était le second pays ayant le plus grand nombre de victimes du terrorisme en 2014. De quoi interpellé sur les réalités d'un mouvement global, sa place et son influence sur le continent Africain, qui, s'il n'y est pas moins violent, semble être délaissé. Le Journal International se penche sur ce terrorisme oublié.



AMISOM et l'armée nationale somalienne tentent de repousser Al Shabaab du corridor d'Afgoye. Crédits : Flickr / AMISOM Public Information

Les caractéristiques du [djihadisme en Afrique](#) sont multiples et diverses, prenant notamment ses forces dans les trafics de drogue, de pétrole, de contrebande mais aussi dans les enlèvements.

TERRORISME ET TRAFICS EN TOUS GENRES

Ces groupes terroristes participent plus au moins directement à des trafics divers qui génèrent des revenus énormes. Concernant les drogues, trois principales sont présentes dans la région : la cocaïne en provenance d'Amérique Latine, l'héroïne venant d'Afghanistan, du Laos, de la Birmanie et de la Thaïlande et la drogue synthétique dont l'Afrique est le producteur et qui est exportée vers l'Extrême-Orient. Si les groupes djihadistes ne mettent pas proprement en œuvre ces trafics, ils assurent la

protection des trafiquants en échange d'une compensation financière conséquente.

Au [Nigéria](#), Boko Haram entretient des liens étroits avec les trafiquants. La cocaïne et les drogues synthétiques se croisent sur le territoire via les ports de Calabart et Port Harcourt, au sud-est du pays. D'importants flux de cocaïne et d'héroïne en provenance de l'Afrique de l'ouest transitent également via la région du Sahel, ce qui s'est d'ailleurs traduit par une coopération entre Boko Haram et AQMI dans le domaine. Alain Rodier, directeur adjoint du Centre français de recherche sur le renseignement, n'hésite d'ailleurs pas à définir Boko Haram comme un « *mouvement narcoterroriste* », soulignant ainsi l'importance de ces trafics dans le bon fonctionnement de l'organisation.

Quant au groupe Al-Shabaab, il entretient des liens étroits avec la piraterie en Somalie. Les pirates fourniraient des armes et une compensation financière au groupe en échange de formations sur le maniement d'armes, d'après Bruno Schiemsy, ancien coordinateur du groupe de surveillance des Nations Unies sur la Somalie et actuel consultant sécurité basé au Kenya.

QUELLES AMBITIONS? DU NIVEAU LOCAL À LA PORTÉE INTERNATIONALE

Si la nature internationale d'AQMI, branche d'Al-Qaeda, ne semble, de ce fait, pas discutable, les deux autres organisations djihadistes doivent faire face à des luttes internes quant à la portée de leurs ambitions et actions.

Boko Haram, n'aurait « *pas d'autres visées que de créer un Califat dans une partie du Nigeria, à défaut de soumettre tout le pays à la loi islamiste, la Sharia* », selon Séga Diarra, rédacteur en chef de Maliactu.net à Bamako. Toutefois, selon une source Reuters, une douzaine de leaders de l'organisation aurait été entraînée en dehors du Nigéria, y compris dans des camps d'entraînement d'AQMI en Algérie et au Mali. L'organisation reçoit par ailleurs du matériel explosif transitant par la région du Sahel. Si les [attentats](#) perpétrés par Boko Haram restent dans une zone géographiquement limitée, il est important de noter que plusieurs attaques ont eu lieu au Niger, au Cameroun ou encore au Tchad. La région du lac Tchad est d'ailleurs placée sous le régime de l'état d'urgence pour tenter de lutter contre ces attaques terroristes.

Al-Shabaab a quant à lui prêté allégeance à Al-Qaeda en 2009, ce qui lui a permis de gagner une importance symbolique qui s'est illustrée par un apport massif de nouveaux combattants. Aussi, et depuis le 11 septembre 2001, la Somalie a été pointée du doigt par les Etats-Unis et de nombreux membres de la communauté internationale, comme Etat failli, terreau du djihadisme, faisant entrer le pays dans les priorités de la guerre contre le terrorisme. Toutefois, l'organisation est divisée quant à la portée géographique de sa lutte. Ces divisions, couplées du conflit avec le gouvernement de transition, l'union africaine et le Kenya, « *ont fortement affaiblis le groupe* », qui, aujourd'hui, s'apparente plus à un mouvement de « *guérilla* », « *présage d'un conflit moins intense mais de longue durée* », selon le journaliste freelance Xavier Aldekoa.

VIOLENCES: LA PROBLÉMATIQUE DU GENRE

De nombreuses violations des droits de l'Homme ont été commises par ces groupes

terroristes. S'il est essentiel de les condamner, Itziar Ruiz-Giménez souligne la nécessité de les contextualiser et de les comprendre. Pour la professeure de relations internationales de l'université autonome de Madrid, « *la religion n'est pas violente, cela dépend de comment l'Etat l'article* » réfèrent directement au rôle que les gouvernements somalien, nigérien et malien ont eu dans la radicalisation de ces groupes djihadistes.

Plus spécifiquement, Itziar Ruiz-Giménez dénonce la violence causée aux femmes, qui « *n'est pas irrationnelle mais directement liée au système patriarcal* » et donc aux violences de genre qui ont lieu, non pas seulement dans les zones de conflits, mais dans de nombreuses sociétés. A titre d'exemple, Boko Haram donne gratuitement des femmes combattants ce qui, comme le souligne Xavier Aldekoa, « *facilite le recrutement de nouveaux membres* ». Les viols et mariages forcés sont aussi une pratique caractéristique d'Al-Shabaab.

Une nouvelle tactique a été développée, que Xavier Aldekoa nomme « *les jeunes filles bombes* », faisant référence à l'emploi de [femmes](#) et d'enfants comme kamikazes. Au Nigéria, « *150 attentats suicides ont eu lieu depuis un an et demi, plus de 50% d'entre eux étaient des filles* ».

QUELLES ALTERNATIVES ?

La réponse est sans appel, pour Itziar Ruiz-Giménez et Xavier Aldekoa, « *la solution uniquement militaire est un fracas annoncé* ».

LA NARRATION DES ÉVÈNEMENTS: UN DANGER POTENTIEL?

Un des problèmes, souligné par Itziar Ruiz-Giménez, est la narration de la situation politique, sociale et sécuritaire des pays concernés. « Chaos », « Etat fracassé », « nouveau barbarisme » sont des mots qui reviennent régulièrement quand on parle, par exemple, de la Somalie. Pour l'enseignante-chercheuse de l'université autonome de Madrid, ce sont des explications dangereuses qui, de fait, « manipulent la réalité » et empêchent de comprendre entièrement les processus de déstabilisation politique et de radicalisation.

En se référant plus précisément aux groupes djihadistes, Itziar Ruiz-Giménez dénonce « *une essentialisation des différences ethniques, culturelles et religieuses [qui] manipulent les identités des populations* ». En ce sens, et reprenant son argument sur la nécessité d'appréhender les violences via une analyse du genre, elle souligne qu'il est « *très dangereux de dire que les violations des droits de l'Homme sont une conséquence du fanatisme* ». Il y a plusieurs causes, notamment l'ingérence de forces étrangères » dans les pays concernés, les Etats-Unis en Somalie ou encore la France au Mali.

Ces politiques étrangères ont été « modelées » depuis le 11 septembre 2001, avec une sécurisation de la politique internationale ayant débouchée sur une militarisation des sociétés via un renforcement des capacités militaires et politiques de nombreux gouvernements « *qui violent également les droits de l'Homme* ». Pour expliquer cette tendance, Itziar Ruiz-Giménez se réfère et dénonce l'usage de la doctrine du moindre mal qui, selon le courant réaliste des relations internationales, considère la poursuite par l'Etat d'une politique de puissance comme un fait et une conduite souhaitable comme moindre mal.

REDÉFINIR LES POLITIQUES INTÉRIEURES ET EXTÉRIEURES DE NOS SOCIÉTÉS

Xavier Aldekoa et Itziar Ruiz-Giménez concluent en lançant quelques pistes. « *Les politiques de paix commencent par une redéfinition des politiques extérieures* », et ces dernières ne doivent se baser sur des intérêt économiques et politiques mais sur une logique de solidarité internationale et de développement mutuel.

Aussi, si ces groupes se nourrissent de manques politiques, économiques et sociaux au niveau local, national voir régional, « *nous devons nous interroger sur ce qui se passe dans les sociétés occidentales* ». En Europe, les différents systèmes d'intégration ont montré leurs faiblesses, aboutissant sur des systèmes que Itziar Ruiz-Giménez caractérise d'inégalitaires et racistes. Cette tendance s'illustre profondément aujourd'hui par « une criminalisation des réfugiés » en Europe. En soulignant la nécessité d'adopter, entre autres, une nouvelle politique migratoire, Xavier Aldekoa nous ramène aux nombreuses problématiques soulevées par les mouvements djihadistes : le rôle politique et économique des Etats, l'intégration des femmes, les politiques d'intégration d'ici et d'ailleurs impliquent de redéfinir nombre de normes qui, dans un contexte d'urgence, n'est, pour beaucoup, pas envisageable.

<http://www.lejournalinternational.fr/>

Analysis: No country in the Sahel and Maghreb is immune from Al-Qaeda contagion

19 MAY 2016



Given the key features of attacks by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to date, it becomes more apparent which countries could be targeted next by the Islamist group. In this regard, Senegal may be at a particular threat. By RYAN CUMMINGS and NICK PIPER

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) demonstrated that it remains a force to be reckoned with by executing spectacular attacks in key areas in [Mali](#), [Burkina Faso](#) and, most recently, [Cote d'Ivoire](#). Many were surprised by the violence which targeted tourist-popular beachfronts and flagship hotels which had long been insulated from the myriad socio-political perils afflicting the states in which they existed. For some, however, the attacks were less anomalous but rather defined as the culmination of a long-brewing threat which had been inadequately addressed or even possibly neglected.

In Mali, AQIM has been particularly active since 2012 when a military coup and associated security vacuum afforded the organisation a foothold in the country. Although violence focused on militant strongholds in Mali's desert north, a series of shootings in Bamako in early 2015 demonstrated that armed actors had the intent and operational capacity to target the Malian capital.

Likewise, in Burkina Faso, the threat of militancy was also rising. Prior to the assault on Ouagadougou's Splendid Hotel and adjacent Cappuccino Café, Islamist militants had executed several attacks targeting both security and civilian interests in the country's Oursi department bordering Mali. This included the [August 2015 kidnapping](#) of a Romanian national at a manganese mine near the settlement of Tam-

bao.

In Côte d'Ivoire, security along the [country's northern border areas](#) in the departments of Korhogo, Odiénne and Kouto was increased in mid-2015. This was primarily due to the AQIM-aligned and Malian-based Ansar Dine group specifically threatening Côte d'Ivoire for its ongoing support to the Malian government counterterrorism operations. The jihadist threat to Côte d'Ivoire was demonstrated when Ansar Dine claimed responsibility for the [July 2015 attack](#) on the Malian town of Fakola, located about 15km from the Ivorian border.

In all of the aforementioned attacks, there were a number of similarities which, upon further inspection, may dictate where AQIM and its affiliates could strike next. The most conspicuous of these is geography. AQIM's propensity to execute attacks appears to be tied to a target's proximity to the group's core operational bases in Mali. That country's long and porous borders with Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire likely played an important role in facilitating the movement of operational cells and other assets to these countries prior to the recent attacks. Moreover, spatial proximity dictates that Malian-based militants could have ethnic, tribal and familial ties in countries such as Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire off which it can leverage to establish operational and logistical networks.

The place of target is another factor. Attacks have occurred in major political and commercial centres in Francophone countries that continue to have strong political, economic and military ties to France. This is probably in direct retaliation to the respective governments' ongoing partnerships with France, with specific reference to their direct and tacit support of French-led counterterrorism operations targeting AQIM positions in Mali and the wider Sahel.

The choice of target further underlines the anti-French undertones. AQIM and its affiliates have sought vulnerable public venues popular with local and foreigners alike. However, a key feature of Bamako's Radisson Blu Hotel, the Splendid Hotel and Cappuccino Café in Ouagadougou and the Grand-Bassam beachfront near Abidjan, is their popularity with French diplomats, holidaymakers and expatriates.

Given the key features of AQIM attacks to date, it becomes more apparent which countries could be targeted next by the Islamist group. In this regard, Senegal may be at a particular threat. The country's involvement in regional [counterterrorism initiatives](#), its status as a regional commercial hub and ongoing [military alliances](#) with Western powers, makes it an attractive target for Islamist extremists. A spate of terrorist arrests in the country, in addition to the precautionary bolstering of security at key locations and events, further reinforces the discernible terrorism threat Senegal faces.

Niger and Mauritania may also find themselves in AQIM's crosshairs. Niger will be particularly susceptible, given previous operations by the group in the country. In perhaps the most significant recent incident, notorious jihadist commander and leader of al-Mourabitoun, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, orchestrated simultaneous attacks on the towns of [Agadez and Arlit](#) – one of which targeted a uranium mining facility operated by French mining company, Areva. The incident, which was claimed as an act of retaliation to France's military presence in Mali, came three years after a group of seven foreign nationals were [kidnapped](#) by AQIM near Arlit.

Despite its proximity to Mali, its support of regional counterterrorism operations

and its strong ties with France, Mauritania has been spared from attacks by AQIM and its affiliates. Initially thought to be down to the prowess of the country's security forces, reports released earlier in 2016 indicate that Mauritania's immunity may have been down to a [deal its government brokered](#) with AQIM's leadership. If such a deal indeed exists, and the publicising thereof brings an end to the arrangement, Mauritania itself could be targeted in AQIM violence.

As AQIM continues to expand its operational presence across the expanse of the Sahel and Maghreb regions of the continent, no country within the region can consider itself immune from its deadly contagion. However, in assessing the threat, it is key to note that AQIM attacks are not random or lacking motivation. They have been designed and executed to send a very specific message to those receiving it. **DM**

Photo: A general view of damaged vehicles outside of the Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso 18 January 2016. According to media reports at least 28 people from 18 nationalities were killed after Islamist militants attacked The Splendid Hotel frequented by many westerners in Burkina Faso the evening of 15 January 2016. A joint operation by French and Burkina Faso forces freed many hostages on 16 January 2016. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed responsibility. EPA/WOUTER ELSEN

“(They) have Al Shabaab, which has been designated a terrorist organization, and our concern is how much money is going to them?” Kerns told KING 5.

<http://www.wnd.com/2016/>

Mokhtar Belmokhtar "réapparaît" dans une série de messages

21/05/2016



Mokhtar Belmokhtar serait vivant ou c'est le message qu'a voulu faire passer le groupe terroriste dont il est le chef. Diffusés le jeudi 19 mai, la série de textes attribués au terroriste algérien par l'organisation qui a fait allégeance à l'AQMI, appelle les peuples d'Afrique du Nord à se soulever contre les régimes et à rejoindre les groupes terroristes.

Lesdits textes appellent explicitement les Marocains et les Algériens à se soulever contre leurs régimes, les Mauritaniens à rejoindre les djihadistes qui combattent dans l'Azawad au nord du Mali et les Égyptiens à embrasser le djihad. C'est la première, faut-il le souligner, que ce groupe intègre l'Égypte dans ses textes.

Tous ces messages sont signés le "commandant Khaled Abou Al-Abbas", nom de guerre de Belmokhtar. Une insistance qui voulait, implicitement, souligner que le chef terroriste était encore vivant.

Au début du mois de mai, le journal français Le Monde, avait rapporté que le terroriste algérien serait apparu brièvement en compagnie de terroristes libyens dans une vidéo postée sur les réseaux sociaux. On a toutefois relevé que la séquence en question ne donnait aucune indication de la date à laquelle elle aurait été filmée.

La série de messages de cette semaine attribués au terroriste Algérien ne permet pas non plus de lever le voile sur son sort réel

En juin 2015, les américains avait annoncé l'avoir visé par des frappes aériennes. Les groupes terroristes avaient aussitôt infirmé sa mort.

<http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/>

Burundi

Burundi: A Dangerous Third Term

20 May 2016



REUTERS/Evrard Ngendakumana

The full report is available in: [Français](#)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

One year after President Pierre Nkurunziza's decision to run for a third term sparked the crisis, the situation remains critical. The radicalisation of the regime, which had been steadily increasing since the second post-conflict elections in 2010 and intensified by tensions over the third term in 2015, has seen the rise of the most hard-line leaders of the ruling party. These figures are determined to do away with the institutional system established by the Arusha accord – an agreement between Hutu and Tutsi elites in 2000 which put in place an ethnic quota system for state institutions, including the army, and established a two-term presidential limit. This political strategy to dismantle the accord and the return of violent rhetoric and tactics reminiscent of the civil war, have generated great fear within Burundian society – which, although deeply alarmed, has not yet given in to politicians' tactics of inciting ethnic hatred. With the government and opposition invited to meet in Tanzania on 21 May, it is imperative that the guarantors of the Arusha accord call on them to engage in a meaningful dialogue on the future of the peace agreement and avoid a repeat of the country's tragic past.

Violence, fear, socio-economic decline and deepening social fractures have characterised the beginning of the president's third term. Following protests in April 2015 and Nkurunziza's re-election in July, confrontation has taken the form of urban guerrilla warfare which, beyond the targeted assassinations, torture and disappearances, has had an insidious and devastating impact. By using ethnically-charged rhetoric and demonstrating an obvious desire to bring the democratic consensus of the Arusha accord to an end, the regime has ruptured its relations with part of the population. Some 250,000 Burundians have fled, including a significant portion of the political and economic establishment as well as civil society activists. The flight has drained Burundi of its most dynamic citizens and exposed divisions between the regime on one hand, and the army, the capital and the Tutsi community on the other. Trade between Bujumbura and the countryside has also been disrupted and, according to recent estimates, 10 per cent of the population (1.1 million people) are in need of humanitarian assistance of some kind.

The paradox at the heart of this confrontation is that while Burundi has democratised, the ruling party, the Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), has not. An institutionalised ethnic power-sharing system is completely divorced from a radicalised ethnically-homogenous party reverting to its historical roots (rebel leaders of the civil war era). As the opposition, now forced into exile, seems unable to overcome its own longstanding ethnic cleavages, the regime's current strategy of repression (alleging a Tutsi conspiracy, breaking up the security services and creating units loyal to the regime) has revived fears of genocidal violence within the Tutsi community. There are no signs at present that the population is ready to be mobilised for violence on ethnic grounds. But the simmering social and humanitarian crisis, part of the population's physical, political and economic insecurity, and fear itself, have created the perfect conditions for the situation's further deterioration and ethnic polarisation.

While many Burundians and the international community believed the ethnic problem had been solved with the Arusha accord, it has returned to the fore with President Nkurunziza's third term. To reverse this trend, a debate should be organised on the necessary amendments to the peace agreement. The regime is presently staging sham debates through a "national dialogue" which remains completely under its control. Ideally, a debate on the Arusha accord would take place in Burundi. This, however, would require the government to lift current restrictions on civil liberties (freedom of expression, press and assembly, etc.) and allow the opposition to return from exile.

Before these conditions are met and in order to overcome the current impasse, a discussion between the opposition and the government on the future of the Arusha accord should take place outside of the country under the auspices of the guarantors of the peace agreement. The meeting called by former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa on 21 May should be the first step in the dialogue on the future of the Arusha accord. In parallel, international actors, the UN and the African Union (AU) in particular, should take measures to prevent the crisis from descending into ethnic conflict and a humanitarian emergency, and prepare for an immediate intervention to prevent large-scale violence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To reduce tensions, restart the dialogue and convince the government and the oppo-

sition to participate

To the government:

1. Engage in constructive dialogue with the opposition, allow the media and civil society to work independently and free from fear, and revise its violent approach to political dissent.

To the opposition:

2. Renounce violence and, for the unarmed opposition in exile, engage in a constructive dialogue with the government and resolve internal disagreements in order to present a common front and clear positions.

To the UN, African Union (AU), East African Community (EAC) and European Union (EU):

3. Formalise a single international mediation structure in order to speak with one voice.

To the guarantors of the Arusha accord (in particular Tanzania and South Africa):

4. Form a working group comprising the National Council for the Restoration of the Arusha Accord and the Rule of Law (Conseil national pour le respect de l'accord d'Arusha pour la paix et la réconciliation au Burundi et de l'Etat de droit, CNARED), the National Forces of Liberation (Forces nationales de libération, FNL), and the CNDD-FDD tasked with discussing the necessary amendments to be made to the Arusha peace agreement.

To the AU and the EU:

5. Agree on how to implement the EU decision to change the financing arrangements for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by bypassing the government and disbursing funds directly to the soldiers.

6. The AU and its partners should also look for another troop contributing country to eventually replace Burundian soldiers within AMISOM in order to prevent Burundian authorities from using participation in the mission as diplomatic leverage.

To prevent a descent into ethnic conflict and be ready to intervene in case of mass violence

To donors who suspended part of their financial aid (the EU, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the U.S. and Switzerland):

7. Contribute financially to track hate speech by the authorities and the opposition in order to fight attempts at ethnic polarisation. Burundian NGOs, with the assistance of some donors, have already begun doing this, but they require further assistance, specifically to cover speeches by local authorities in the provinces. Financial assistance for the documentation of human rights abuses should also be sustained and increased.

To the UN, the AU, the EU and bilateral partners:

8. The AU should put in place and the EU and the U.S. should expand sanctions regimes to include those propagating hate speech.

9. Agree to deploy immediately several hundred human rights observers and armed international police.

10. Take the necessary measures so that a rapid deployment force can be dispatched in case of emergency, which could include troops from the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO).

To Burundian and international NGOs involved in local conflict resolution before the current crisis with local mediation structures in place:

11. Reorient the work of these structures toward the documentation of human rights abuses and hate speech in Bujumbura and in the provinces.

To mitigate the impact of the economic and social crisis on the population

To donors who suspended part of their financial aid (the EU, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the U.S. and Switzerland):

12. Verify the political neutrality and technical reliability of non-governmental actors in the context of changing the terms of aid provision. This requires a rigorous political and operational assessment of these actors. For some of them, a partnership with international NGOs and a strengthening of their financial and managerial capacities will be essential.

13. Fund monitoring mechanisms to evaluate the status of food security and sanitation, and conduct budgetary studies to identify the breaking point of key health and agricultural sectors in order to calibrate the financial support they need. Donors should ensure financing changes to their programs do not result in the interruption of all ongoing funding.

14. Create a committee to monitor the Burundian economy, specifically in the health and agriculture sectors and access to basic services.

15. Make available funds for the emergency humanitarian plan, which remains under-funded.

Nairobi/Brussels, 20 May 2016

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/>

La lutte contre le terrorisme, un défi majeur pour l'UE-MOA, selon Hamed Bakayok

13/05/2016



Le ministre d'Etat ivoirien en charge de l'intérieur et de la sécurité, Hamed Bakayoko a souligné jeudi, à Grand-Bassam que la lutte contre le terrorisme constitue un "défi majeur qui appelle une réponse collective et coordonnée des Etats de l'Union économique et monétaire ouest- africain (UEMOA) ».

"La lutte contre le terrorisme constitue un défi majeur qui appelle une réponse collective et coordonnée de la part des Etats membres de l'Union », a insisté le ministre d'Etat ivoirien à l'ouverture d'une rencontre régionale sur la mise en œuvre des chantiers de développement territorial dans l'espace UEMOA.

Cette rencontre se tient dans la cité balnéaire de Grand-Bassam (20 km au Sud d'Abidjan) théâtre, d'une attaque terroriste qui a fait officiellement 22 morts le 13 mars dernier.

A cette occasion Hamed Bakayoko a "salué la franche collaboration et la coopération avec les autorités maliennes qui a permis l'arrestation de plusieurs personnes impliquées » dans les attaques de cette ville classée patrimoine de l'Organisation des Nations-unies pour l'éducation, la science et la culture (UNESCO), tout en appelant "à la vigilance à tous les niveaux ».

Pour lui, cette rencontre de Grand-Bassam, permettra de “consolider le dynamisme général mis en œuvre en matière de développement territorial, de décentralisation, de gouvernance et de participation citoyenne dans l’optique de l’atteinte des objectifs de développement durable ».

Augustin Tompieu-Zouo du Département de l’aménagement du territoire communautaire et des transports (DATC) de la Commission de l’UEMOA a quant à lui fait remarquer que les pays de l’UEMOA évoluent dans un “environnement marqué par de fréquentes mutations qui font apparaître des défis sociaux et le développement sans cesse changeant et diversifiant ».

En guise d’anticipation, une politique d’aménagement du territoire communautaire de l’UEMOA a été élaborée et prévoit un outil de gestion de l’espace communautaire.

“Il s’agit notamment du schéma de développement de l’espace régional, l’observateur régional d’analyse spatial du territoire communautaire, l’étude relative au foncier urbain ... “, a cité Augustin Tompieu-Zouo.

A en croire le Commissaire de l’UEMOA, ces outils permettront à la commission, aux Etats et aux partenaires techniques et financiers de disposer de données appropriées de gestion de l’espace communautaire d’optimiser l’exploitation des ressources disponibles pour corriger les disparités régionales.

Le Maire de la commune de Treichville, Albert François Amichia, par ailleurs, président du Conseil des collectivités territoriales de l’UEMOA CCT/UEMOA a salué “l’engagement de la commission qui nous a permis de nous positionner aujourd’hui comme un organe opérationnel sûr et surtout autour duquel les leviers du développement territorial peuvent se déployer ».

Des actions ont permis, a poursuivi le ministre ivoirien des sports Albert François Amichia, de “mobiliser d’importants partenaires au développement dont l’appui nous permet de figurer dans l’agenda des 21 solutions pour la lutte contre le changement climatique et le mécanisme communautaire de financement des collectivités territoriales qui sont entrain d’être mis en place ».

“Ce mécanisme a pour objectifs de mobiliser les financements additionnels pour la mise en œuvre des politiques d’accès au service publics locaux, lutter contre le changement climatique dans une zone qui compte plus de 3000 collectivités territoriales », a-t-il situé tout en réitérant la demande aux Etats de la zone d’allouer au moins 21% de leurs ressources afin de répondre aux attentes de développement des populations.

L’Union économique et monétaire ouest africaine (UEMOA) a été créée par le traité signé à Dakar (Sénégal), le 10 janvier 1994 par les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement des huit pays de l’Afrique de l’Ouest ayant en commun l’usage du franc CFA.

Il s’agit du Bénin, du Burkina Faso, de la Côte d’Ivoire, de la Guinée Bissau, du Mali, du Niger, du Sénégal et du Togo.

<http://fr.starafrica.com/>

Egypt

Crash d'EgyptAir: analyses ADN pour les victimes, les recherches se poursuivent



Le Caire (AFP)-Le pénible travail d'identification des victimes du vol d'EgyptAir Paris-Le Caire a commencé mardi avec la comparaison de l'ADN des proches à des morceaux de corps repêchés, mais la recherche des boîtes noires s'annonce longue et difficile pour espérer élucider les raisons du crash.

L'A320 est tombé pour une raison encore indéterminée jeudi entre la Crète et la côte nord de l'Egypte avec 66 personnes à bord, dont 30 Egyptiens et 15 Français, après avoir soudainement disparu des écrans radar.

La recherche des deux boîtes noires pourrait durer encore "plusieurs jours" en attendant le déploiement du matériel spécialisé. Cinq jours après le drame, les autorités attendent toujours de trancher entre l'hypothèse de l'acte criminel ou "terroriste" et l'accident dû à une avarie.

Le directeur de l'institut médico-légal Hicham Abdel-Hamid a par ailleurs démenti des informations publiées mardi par des médias selon lesquelles l'analyse des parties de corps repêchées montrait qu'il y avait eu une explosion.

Des experts et des sources proches de l'enquête ont également assuré à l'AFP que les informations publiées dans la presse ne permettaient pas de tirer de conclusion sur les causes du crash.

"Dans un avion qui tombe, il y a forcément une explosion à un moment ou un autre, qui réduit l'appareil en pièces, que ce soit en l'air -le résultat d'une explosion due à une avarie ou un acte criminel-, ou quand l'appareil touche la mer, après une chute de 11 km de haut" comme c'est le cas pour cet A320, a commenté une de ces sources.

"Cela ne fait pas avancer l'enquête, à moins qu'on ne trouve une trace d'explosif, ce qui n'est pas le cas à ce stade", selon cette source.

"Aucune trace d'explosif n'a été décelée pour l'heure", a par ailleurs assuré une autre source.

Le Bureau d'enquêtes et d'analyses (BEA) avait déjà indiqué samedi que le système automatisé de l'appareil avait émis des alertes signalant de la fumée notamment à l'avant de l'appareil et des défaillances des systèmes électroniques gérant les commandes de vol, réhabilitant la thèse de l'incident technique.

Le président du Comité grec de sécurité aérienne, Athanassios Binis, a indiqué pour sa part mardi que son pays allait envoyer "dans les prochains jours" à l'Egypte les données disponibles sur le vol d'Egyptair, comme les entretiens enregistrés.

- Recherches "en surface" -

Au Caire, les médecins légistes ont prélevé l'ADN de proches des victimes, afin de tenter d'identifier les membres humains repêchés dans la zone présumée du crash, a indiqué EgyptAir.

"Des membres humains sont arrivés à la morgue au Caire, dimanche et lundi", a affirmé à l'AFP le président d'EgyptAir Safwat Mussallam. "Des prélèvements ADN ont été effectués avec les familles pour déterminer l'identité" des victimes, précise un communiqué de la compagnie.

<http://www.sen360.com/>

Terrorism suspected in crash of Egyptian plane

New York Times

Thursday, May 19, 2016 2:45pm

CAIRO — An Egyptian jetliner carrying 66 people from Paris to Cairo abruptly swerved, vanished from radar and plunged into the Mediterranean early Thursday, shortly before it was scheduled to land.

Egyptian officials issued conflicting information about whether wreckage had been found and suggested terrorism was a more likely cause than technical failure.

The loss of the flight, EgyptAir 804, was the second civilian aviation disaster for Egypt in the past year. It immediately resurrected fears and speculation about the safety and security of Egyptian air travel and broader questions about terrorism against civilian air travel.

Egypt and Greece mounted an intense search-and-rescue operation in the southern Aegean Sea, and, on Thursday afternoon, Greek authorities said debris believed to be from the wreckage had been found southeast of Crete and south of the Greek island of Karpathos.

EgyptAir reported "the finding of wreckage of the missing aircraft" in a Twitter posting. But hours later EgyptAir's vice chairman, Ahmed Adel, was quoted by CNN as saying no wreckage had been found yet.

"We stand corrected on finding the wreckage because what we identified is not a part of our plane," he was quoted as saying. "So the search and rescue is still going on."

The Egyptian civil aviation minister, Sherif Fathi, told a news conference in Cairo that it was premature to draw conclusions about the cause of the crash, but he quickly acknowledged that it might be terrorism.

"I don't want to go to speculations and I don't want to go to assumptions," Fathi said. Still, he said, "if you analyze the situation properly," the possibility of "having a terror attack is higher than the possibility" of technical failure.

The jetliner, an Airbus A320, departed Paris at 11:09 p.m. local time Wednesday. The pilot spoke to Greek air traffic controllers after 2:20 a.m. and nothing seemed out of the ordinary, officials said. Three or four minutes later, the plane made its last normal radar contact.

At 2:37 a.m., shortly after entering Egyptian airspace, the plane made a 90-degree turn to the left and then a full circle to the right, first plunging to 15,000 feet from 37,000 feet and then to 9,000 feet. At that point it disappeared from radar, the Greek defense minister, Panos Kammenos, said at a news conference on Thursday afternoon.

Flight 804 was carrying 56 passengers, including three children; seven crew members; and three members of airline security. A list of the passengers' nationalities, released by the airline, said that 30 were from Egypt, 15 from France, two from Iraq

and one each from Algeria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Chad, Kuwait, Portugal, Saudi Arabia and Sudan.

The twin-engine aircraft, which can accommodate up to 220 passengers, was delivered to EgyptAir in November 2003 and had accumulated 48,000 hours of flying time, according to data compiled by Flightradar24, an aviation website. Such aircraft are typically built to last 30 or 40 years, and there was no indication anything was mechanically amiss.

But the aircraft's North Africa itinerary in the past two days was possibly more worrisome. Flightradar24 data showed it had flown round trips between Cairo and Asmara, Eritrea, and between Cairo and Tunis before flying to Paris. U.S. and European officials have expressed concerns about security gaps in North African airports.

Intelligence analysts who monitor jihadi websites and social media said there had been no claims of responsibility by terrorist groups.

Officials in Egypt, who have been under intense scrutiny since a bomb brought down a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula in October, killing all 224 people on board, declined to describe the events on Wednesday as a crash. The aviation minister's quick acknowledgment that terrorism might be a cause this time was in stark contrast to the government's handling of the loss of the Russian airliner.

The French president, Francois Hollande, after speaking by telephone with President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi of Egypt, also raised the possibility of terrorism. "The information that we have been able to gather — the prime minister, the members of the government, and, of course, the Egyptian authorities — unfortunately confirm for us that this plane crashed at sea and has been lost," Hollande said at the Élysée Palace.

President Barack Obama was briefed on the situation by Lisa O. Monaco, his adviser for homeland security and counterterrorism. "The president asked to be updated throughout the day as the situation warrants, and directed administration officials to reach out to their international counterparts to offer support and assistance," the White House said in a statement.

U.S. officials said that they were sharing information from a terrorist watch list as well as other data with Egyptian, French and other investigators, but that there was no evidence so far of what had caused the plane to vanish.

At 3:14 a.m., Greek authorities began a search operation, deploying a C-130 military transport plane. At 4:26 a.m. — nearly two hours after the last radar contact — the plane emitted a signal, although it was not clear whether that was an emergency distress signal sent by a crew member or an automated signal from the plane's onboard computers.

"We don't know if the pilot had something to do with this or if it is just the plane sending it," said Ihab Raslan, a spokesman for the Egyptian Civil Aviation Ministry.

<http://www.tampabay.com/>

Libye: l'embargo sur les armes bientôt partiellement levé

16-05-2016



Le Premier ministre du gouvernement d'union nationale libyen Fayez al-Sarraj et le secrétaire d'Etat américain John Kerry, à Vienne, le 16 mai 2016.

© REUTERS/Leonhard Foeger/POOL

Le gouvernement d'union de Fayez el-Sarraj devrait bientôt pouvoir recevoir des armes pour combattre les terroristes sur son territoire, en particulier le groupe Etat islamique. La communauté internationale représentée par les pays voisins de la Libye, l'Union africaine, l'Union européenne, la Ligue arabe et les Etats-Unis, était réunie à Vienne ce lundi 16 mai. Les 24 délégations se sont prononcées en faveur d'une levée partielle de l'embargo sur les armes qui touche la Libye.

Alors que les positions divergent sur **une éventuelle intervention en Libye**, la communauté internationale s'est mise d'accord pour apporter un soutien militaire au nouveau gouvernement libyen : il s'agit de lui donner les moyens de **s'attaquer lui-même aux terroristes**, en particulier au groupe **Etat islamique, qui continue sa progression** dans le pays.

Les 24 délégations africaines, arabes, européennes, onusiennes et américaines réunies ce lundi à Vienne ont annoncé qu'elles soutenaient la demande du Premier ministre Fayez el-Sarraj qui compte réclamer la levée partielle de **l'embargo sur les armes** qui touche son pays depuis 2011. « *Nous avons reçu la demande du gouvernement d'union et elle doit évidemment être débattue dans le respect des processus onusien. Mais l'embargo sur les armes autorise bien le gouvernement d'union à demander des armes si elles sont spécifiquement destinées à la sécurisation du pays et à la lutte contre le groupe Etat islamique* », a déclaré John Kerry.

Dérogation

Mais le secrétaire d'Etat américain précise : *« Il y a un équilibre délicat à trouver, mais tous ici, nous soutenons l'idée que s'il y existe un gouvernement légitime et que ce gouvernement légitime combat le terrorisme, ce gouvernement légitime ne doit pas être prisonnier d'une action que l'ONU a prise justement dans l'attente d'un gouvernement légitime. Donc cette dérogation fait sens mais elle doit bien sûr être définie avec précision et c'est ce à quoi nous allons faire attention ».*

Cette décision doit permettre au gouvernement d'union de recevoir armes et munitions pour combattre l'organisation Etat islamique et d'autres groupes terroristes, a souligné le secrétaire d'Etat américain John Kerry. Les ministres se sont dits également prêts à soutenir la formation de la garde présidentielle et des forces autorisées.

→ A (RE)LIRE : **Libye: cinq ans après, de la révolution au groupe EI**

Pour le secrétaire d'état américain John Kerry, l'unanimité de cette décision marque la reconnaissance et le soutien de la communauté internationale au gouvernement Sarraj en tant qu'unique autorité légitime, seule à même de sortir le pays de la crise. *« Il est impératif que la communauté internationale appuie de tout son poids le gouvernement d'union : c'est la seule instance qui peut unifier le pays et apporter une réponse aux crises économiques et humanitaires, a-t-il rappelé. Les Libyens veulent un gouvernement, ce gouvernement existe, il est soutenu par la communauté internationale et il est prêt à se mettre au travail. C'est le seul moyen pour que des institutions vitales comme la Banque centrale et la compagnie nationale de pétrole soient dirigées par des autorités représentatives et reconnues. Et c'est le seul moyen de générer l'unité et la cohésion nécessaires pour venir à bout de l'organisation Etat islamique et des autres groupes extrémistes qui tentent de replonger la Libye dans la violence et dans les batailles d'égo entre des individus qui servent leurs propres intérêts plutôt que ceux du pays. »*

Embargo renforcer pour le gouvernement de Tobrouk

En parallèle de cette dérogation, la communauté internationale compte renforcer encore plus le contrôle de l'embargo sur les armes, mais aussi sur les exportations pétrolières, contre les factions rivales au gouvernement d'union de Favez el-Sarraj.

Selon Mattia Toaldo, spécialiste de la Libye, ce message est notamment destiné à mettre la pression sur le parlement basé à Tobrouk, à l'est du pays, et qui n'a toujours pas rallié le gouvernement d'union. *« L'est du pays a essayé dans les mois derniers de vendre plusieurs fois du pétrole sans l'approbation du gouvernement de Tripoli. Avec cette mesure contre les institutions parallèles, il devient très difficile pour le gouvernement dans l'est du pays de vendre du pétrole sans l'approbation de Tripoli »*, analyse-t-il.

Cette décision de la communauté internationale intervient alors que le groupe Etat islamique a étendu son emprise sur la région à l'ouest de Syrte la semaine dernière en s'emparant de la localité d'Abou Grein.

<http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/>

Nigeria

Nigeria: comment la forêt de Sambisa ralentit la guerre contre Boko Haram



L'armée nigérienne ratisse la forêt de Sambisa à la recherche d'insurgés de Boko Haram. Le 2 mai 2016

Par **RFI** Publié le 21-05-2016 Modifié le 21-05-2016 à 08:38

Au Nigeria, l'armée affirme avoir libéré quatre-vingt-dix-sept femmes et enfants lors d'une offensive dans la forêt de Sambisa, le jeudi 19 mai. L'une des otages libérée compte parmi les lycéennes de Chibok enlevées en avril 2014, ce que démentent les familles de Chibok. Toujours est-il que l'armée multiplie les interventions dans cette forêt qui est, depuis 2013 le sanctuaire des insurgés. Ces opérations se soldent souvent par des dizaines de terroristes tués ou capturés, des armes confisquées et des camps démantelés, assure l'armée, photos à l'appui. Mais cela reste insuffisant pour venir à bout de Boko Haram. Et c'est sans doute lié à l'étendue de cette forêt au relief hostile.

La forêt de Sambisa, une ancienne réserve animalière, à cheval sur une demi-douzaine d'Etats est grande comme le Togo. Elle est recouverte d'épineux, la végétation y est dense.

Ben Shemang, le correspondant de la rédaction anglaise de RFI, l'a constaté lors de plusieurs missions de reportage avec l'armée nigérienne. « *Maintenant, c'est la saison des pluies. Certaines zones sont marécageuses. D'autres sont rocailleuses. Il y a des zones vraiment infranchissables pour certains véhicules militaires. Et l'armée ne s'est même pas approchée des grottes encore. C'est pourquoi d'ici à ce que tous les camps insurgés soient démantelés, il faudra du temps et mener une guerre, **une grande guerre*** », analyse Shemang.


La zone est aussi minée, et les insurgés ont fait sauter de nombreux ponts. « *Les militaires doivent être très prudents : ils doivent neutraliser ces mines, avant de pouvoir avancer. Pour ça, il y a des équipes de démineurs. Les équipes du génie civil elles, doivent construire des ponts provisoires, pour permettre aux blindés et aux véhicules qui transportent les troupes, le matériel et les vivres d'avancer, c'est pour ça que ça va prendre du temps, tout cela je l'ai vu de mes yeux, j'ai aussi vu un blindé sauter sur une mine qui n'avait pas été repérée* » poursuit Ben Shemang.

L'assaut final contre les insurgés dans la forêt de Sambisa pourrait mobiliser les savoir-faire des différents contingents qui composent la force mixte multinationale.

<http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160521-nigeria-foret-sambisa-guerre-boko-haram-strategie>

Ce que l'on sait de l'avion d'EgyptAir disparu entre Paris et Le Caire

Le Monde.fr avec AFP, AP et Reuters Le 19.05.2016 à 05h26 • Mis à jour le 20.05.2016 à 06h44



Le vol MS804 d'EgyptAir, qui reliait [Paris](#) et Le Caire, a disparu des écrans radar, dans la nuit du mercredi 18 au jeudi 19 mai. Plus de vingt-quatre heures après, aucun élément d'[enquête](#) ne permettait d'expliquer cette disparition. Les recherches se poursuivaient pour [retrouver](#) la trace de l'appareil, qui s'est abîmé en mer Méditerranée.

née, selon les autorités.

Selon le président du Comité grec de sécurité aérienne, Athanassios Binis, les débris retrouvés au large de l'île grecque de Crète, dans la zone proche du point de chute présumé de l'appareil d'EgyptAir, *« ne proviennent pas d'un avion »*. *« Jusqu'à maintenant, l'analyse des débris retrouvés indique qu'ils n'appartiennent pas à un avion (...) Ce qui a été retrouvé, ce sont un morceau de bois et des tissus »*, a-t-il insisté.

Plus tôt, la compagnie aérienne EgyptAir avait annoncé que le ministère des [affaires étrangères](#) égyptien avait confirmé que les débris découverts était bien ceux du vol MS804. Par la suite, le vice-président d'Egyptair, Ahmed Adel, est revenu sur ses déclarations. Le président égyptien, Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi, a lui appelé dans la soirée *« tous les appareils de l'Etat concernés, y compris le ministère de l'aviation civile, la marine et l'[armée](#) de l'air »* à *« intensifier les opérations de recherches »* pour *« retrouver les débris de l'avion »*.

Qui était à bord de l'appareil ?

L'avion, un Airbus A320, comptait 66 personnes à son bord : 56 passagers – parmi lesquels un enfant et deux bébés – et dix membres d'équipage, dont deux pilotes, trois agents de sécurité et cinq membres d'équipage cabine. La compagnie EgyptAir a communiqué la nationalité des passagers : 30 Egyptiens, 15 Français, 2 Irakiens, 1 Britannico-Australien, 1 Belge, 1 Koweïtien, 1 Saoudien, 1 Soudanais, 1 Tchadien, 1 Portugais, 1 Algérien et 1 Canadien.

Quel est le déroulé du vol ?

A **23 h 09**, le vol MS804 quitte le terminal aéroportuaire Paris-Charles-de-Gaulle et décolle dix minutes plus tard.

Vers **1 h 50**, le pilote est en contact avec un contrôleur aérien grec, alors que l'avion se trouvait au-dessus de l'île de Kéa. Lors de ce dernier échange, le pilote n'indique *« aucun problème »*, selon l'aviation civile grecque.

A **2 h 26**, l'avion s'apprête à [sortir](#) de l'espace aérien grec en volant à 37 000 pieds. Le contrôleur grec tente de [contacter](#) le pilote, comme l'exige la réglementation, pour lui [signaler](#) qu'il s'apprête à [rentrer](#) dans l'espace aérien égyptien, sans succès. Aucune anomalie technique (altitude et vitesse) n'est détectée avant que l'avion ne sorte de l'espace aérien grec, selon les données recueillies par [deux sites de suivi des avions commerciaux](#).

A **2 h 29**, l'appareil est entré dans l'espace aérien égyptien. Le pilote ne répond pas aux communications du contrôleur.

A **2 h 37**, l'avion fait deux virages brutaux et chute de 22 000 pieds. Le ministre de la [défense](#) grec, Panos Kammenos, a détaillé lors d'une conférence de presse :

« L'image que nous avons est qu'à 0 h 37 GMT [2 h 37, heure locale], l'avion, qui se trouvait à près de 10-15 miles dans l'espace aérien égyptien, a effectué un virage de 90 degrés à gauche, puis de 360 degrés à droite en chutant de 37 000 à 15 000

pieds, où son image a été perdue, à environ 10 000 pieds. »

A **2 h 39**, les contacts radars avec l'appareil sont perdus. L'appareil se trouvait alors à environ 280 km des côtes égyptiennes (175 miles), et non à une cinquantaine de kilomètres, comme EgyptAir l'avait indiqué dans un premier temps.

C'est à **3 h 15** que le vol aurait dû **atterrir** au Caire.

Les informations sont toutefois contradictoires concernant l'émission d'un signal de détresse par l'appareil. EgyptAir a indiqué qu'un signal a été reçu deux heures après la disparition de l'avion, possiblement émis par une balise automatique. Mais l'**armée** égyptienne a démenti cette information, son porte-parole écrivant sur son compte Facebook qu'aucun « *message de détresse* » n'a été reçu de l'avion.

Avant de **décoller** de l'aéroport Paris-Charles-de-Gaulle pour Le Caire mercredi soir, l'Airbus A320 immatriculé SU-CGC a effectué trois rotations dans la journée, selon le site **Flightradar** : un retour Asmara (**Erythrée**) vers Le Caire ; un aller-retour Tunis (**Tunisie**)-Le Caire, et un vol du Caire à Paris en fin de journée. Le ministre égyptien de l'aviation civile, Chérif Fathi, a confirmé ces informations lors d'une conférence de presse.

Quelles sont les pistes envisagées pour **expliquer cette disparition ?**

Le premier ministre égyptien, Chérif Ismaïl, a déclaré qu'il était encore trop tôt pour expliquer la disparition de l'avion, précisant n'exclure aucune hypothèse. Le ministre de l'aviation civile égyptien, Chérif Fathy, a confirmé ne pas **pouvoir** « *exclure l'hypothèse de l'acte terroriste, ni quelque chose qui relèverait d'un incident technique* ». Un peu plus tard, il a toutefois estimé que l'hypothèse d'une « *attaque terroriste* » était « *plus probable* » que celle d'une défaillance technique. « *Mais je ne veux pas **tirer** de conclusions hâtives* », a-t-il précisé à l'Agence **France**-Presse.

De son côté, **François Hollande** a déclaré, lors d'une brève allocution jeudi, que l'avion s'était « *abîmé* », insistant sur le fait qu'« *aucune hypothèse n'est écartée, aucune n'est privilégiée* ». « *Lorsque nous aurons la vérité, nous devons en tirer toutes les conclusions, que ce soit un accident ou une autre hypothèse que chacun a à l'esprit, peut-être une hypothèse terroriste* », a-t-il ajouté.

Le président français a exprimé sa « *compassion* » et sa « *solidarité* » à l'égard des familles des victimes. Il a souligné vouloir « *que tout soit mis à disposition des autorités grecques et égyptiennes [qui mènent conjointement les recherches en mer] pour qu'en liaison avec elles, [la France puisse] **envoyer** bateaux et avions* » afin de **déterminer** le lieu de la disparition, **tenter** de « *recupérer des débris* » et « *connaître la vérité* ».

Quels sont les moyens mis en place pour l'enquête ?

L'**Egypte**, la France et la **Grèce** ont lancé des recherches en Méditerranée. Paris a dépêché sur la zone de recherche un Falcon 50 de reconnaissance, jusqu'alors assigné à la mission européenne de lutte contre le trafic illicite de migrants en Méditerranée. Un Atlantique 2, avion de patrouille maritime équipé de moyens de détection

avancés, va se rendre à Chypre. De plus, un Aviso, petit bâtiment militaire, appareillera demain de Toulon pour se rendre sur place récupérer éventuellement des débris ou des victimes du crash.

Le Bureau d'enquêtes et d'analyses (BEA) va également dépêcher trois enquêteurs au Caire, accompagnés d'un conseiller technique d'Airbus, afin de participer à l'enquête, a annoncé le secrétaire d'Etat chargé des transports, Alain Vidalies, avant leur départ dans la soirée jeudi.

L'armée grecque a pour sa part dépêché plusieurs avions et une frégate. L'administration américaine a envoyé un avion de patrouille maritime, tandis qu'un navire militaire britannique, le RFA *Lyme Bay*, ainsi qu'un avion de transport militaire C-130 Hercules, basé à Chypre, étaient aussi réquisitionnés.

Cellule de crise

En France, une cellule de crise a été activée à l'aéroport de Roissy, « avec l'ensemble des services de l'Etat et Aéroports de Paris. On a reçu les représentants de la compagnie EgyptAir et de l'ambassade d'Egypte », a précisé le préfet délégué aux aéroports, Philippe Riffaut.

Un numéro d'appel d'urgence a été mis en place par le Quai d'Orsay (01 43 17 55 95).

EgyptAir a également mis en place un numéro d'urgence : 0800 7777 0000 depuis l'Egypte et +202 2598 9320 en dehors du pays.

<http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/>

To find progress in Nigeria, think local



Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria's president, center, listens at a meeting with representatives of state during the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) summit in Tehran, Iran, in November 2015; Buhari's electoral triumph and no-nonsense style sparked high hopes in a country fatigued by chronic corruption, poor infrastructure, the Boko Haram insurgency. MUST CREDIT: Bloomberg photo by Simon Dawson. (Simon Dawson / Simon Dawson)

Siddhartha Mitter, (c) 2016, Foreign Policy(c) 2016, Foreign Policy

On May 29, it will be one year since Nigeria's president Muhammadu Buhari took office. His electoral triumph and no-nonsense style sparked high hopes in a country fatigued by chronic corruption, poor infrastructure, the [Boko Haram](#) insurgency, and the incompetence of his predecessor, Goodluck Jonathan. But it hasn't been an easy year for Africa's largest economy, which has been stunned by the drop in the price of oil - the main source of government revenue and nearly the sole source of foreign exchange. So what has Buhari accomplished?

The evidence is contradictory. On one hand, for instance, a vast anti-corruption campaign is under way - in a country that badly needs it. Buhari re-invigorated the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, the country's lead anti-corruption agency, with aggressive new leadership. Every week brings news of prominent figures being questioned; the sums reportedly in play can reach billions of dollars. But the targeting feels haphazard, the methods are unclear, and running well-handled prosecutions in the country's creaky justice system is a challenge.

Buhari also appointed new leadership at the all-important state oil company, the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Investigations have shown that bil-

lions in revenue due for the public treasury have vanished inside the NNPC in recent years. Now the company is making a commendable effort at transparency, publishing accounts for the first time in years. But the oil sector is still in trouble. There is almost no working refining capacity, so gasoline is imported under a creaky license and subsidy regime that breeds chronic fuel shortages. Meanwhile, militants are sabotaging oil production facilities in the Niger Delta. Just cleaning house won't be enough.

On the positive side, Boko Haram seems to be at bay, but for most Nigerians - except those in the war-affected northeast - it's not even a major issue. The real problem is the country's mounting economic crisis. Foreign exchange is scarce and rationed by the government at nearly twice the value that the national currency, the naira, fetches on the black market. Inflation is rising, and the economy contracted in the first quarter of 2016. Daily life is tough, and not just for the poor. Middle-class Nigerians spend vast amounts of time fighting bureaucratic hassles and looking for fuel for their cars and their at-home generators, since the electricity utilities rarely supply power.

Against this ziggurat of problems, all of which have both proximate causes and underlying ones that have festered for decades, the Buhari government has appeared at some times inert or incompetent, at others, purposeful and aggressive. There's evidence to back every narrative, and Nigerian social media, where an ever-growing share of the population thrashes out its impressions, contains them all.

Nigerians have every right to expect decisive leadership from their chief executive. But the presidency shouldn't be viewed as the only potential source of change. Nigeria is a federal republic, with 36 socially and economically diverse states. This creates room for experimentation: What the federal government can't get done, perhaps the states can.

Devolution of power is somewhat shallower in Nigeria than in some other federations, such as the United States. Still, the states have real authority, and having a reformist state government instead of an old-school, corrupt one makes a real difference to the business environment, the provision of public services, and ordinary people's lives. Moreover, with populations between 2 and 20 million, Nigeria's states are better-sized for reform than the national behemoth. And the lack of any real ideological differences between Buhari's All Progressives Congress, which controls 22 states, and the opposition People's Democratic Party, which has 13, makes a favorable environment for emulating reforms that deliver. (There is one third-party governor, in Anambra state).

When Buhari took office, so did some 20 new governors. As in the past, some states are proving better run than others. The difference now is that the collapse of oil revenue makes it urgent for the states to find new ways to support themselves. In 2014, according to fiscal watchdog BudgIT, federal transfers accounted for 75 percent of total state revenues. Almost all that money came from oil revenue allocated - "shared," in Nigerian parlance - from the federal account. Now, this source of funds has shriveled. Boosting their own resources (known as IGR, or internally generated revenue) is crucial for the states to keep services running. But it is also the key to future policy autonomy and the ability to progress no matter what happens (or doesn't) in Abuja, the national capital.

There is room to grow. A BudgIT analysis of monthly revenue for the first half of 2015 found only one state (Lagos) where IGR made up more than 50 percent of revenue. In a cluster of states, it accounted for 20-25 percent of revenue; in the poorest ones, especially in the north, it was as low as 5-10 percent. In part, the level of development of the local economy helps explain the variation. But another reason is that Nigeria is disastrously under-taxed: according to widely cited estimates, tax collection is only 7 percent of GDP, most of it from the oil sector. The real economy is far more diversified than its revenue base suggests. According to a Nigerian banking institute, at least \$11 billion in non-oil-based taxes escape the government each year.

In the past year, the two states where new governors have taken the most aggressive policy steps are Kaduna, a big, relatively poor state in the north that has been highly dependent on federal transfers, and Lagos, the commercial hub, which has the healthiest state economy and lowest reliance on Abuja. Combined with more tentative efforts in other states, this suggests that leadership and political will, not the underlying condition of the local economy, are the crucial factors for progress in governance.

In Kaduna, a former industrial powerhouse that has fallen on hard times, the hard-charging new governor, Nasir El-Rufai, has launched a volley of reforms: a biometric census of civil servants, an electronic land registry, removing middlemen from subsidy distribution, eliminating school application fees, starting free meals in primary schools, and more. He has instituted a Treasury Single Account ([TSA](#)), combining all the state's revenue streams into one place, so that various agencies are not tempted by waste or graft. El-Rufai has also reduced the number of state ministries, appointed a relatively young, technocratic team, and has brought in the respected former head of the national tax agency to advise on state tax reform. And while data is kept close in most states, Kaduna is partnering with BudgIT to set up an open-budget electronic platform.

The governor of Lagos, Akinwunmi Ambode, had the advantage of a much stronger foundation. Tax collection grew twentyfold from 1999 to 2015 under previous governors. Revenue management was opaque, however. To address this, Ambode also instituted a TSA, in September 2015. According to the state finance commissioner, merging the accounts has already saved the state 6 billion naira (\$30 million at the official rate); restructuring the state's debt portfolio has also saved money. A loan scheme for new small businesses began this year; the governor has promised to complete a long-delayed light-rail line, and secured federal support and cleared right-of-way issues for another. On May 25, four days before his own first-year anniversary, Ambode signed an agreement with a private consortium to build a massive and much-needed new highway and bridge across the Lagos lagoon, boasting that it would require no federal funds.

Some other states are also taking steps to improve governance and grow revenue. In Ogun state, next to Lagos, second-term governor Ibikunle Amosun has overseen a substantial rise of internal revenue, including a 49 percent jump in 2015, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. These results follow a campaign to widen the tax net, with improved enforcement and more competent staff. In Anambra state in the east, internal income grew by nearly 30 percent in 2015; there, the government is replacing often-corrupt collectors with a network of point-of-sale devices.

On the whole, however, more states are in trouble than are finding their way out of it. In 2015, only 11 states grew their tax intake, while the others saw mild to disastrous declines. According to BudgIT, in the first half of 2015, 19 of 36 states were unable to meet recurrent expenditures (such as paying salaries). In July 2015, 27 states sought a federal bailout; there are now controversies about whether some of those funds were mismanaged.

Nigeria's states cannot afford to wait for the federal government to turn the ship around. Emerging from oil dependency requires policy innovation at both the federal and state levels. Better information would help, too. Most state governments are poor at public communications, and the quality of journalism drops off precipitously as you get further from Lagos and Abuja. Lack of scrutiny, in turn, breeds complacency. But when Buhari comes up for re-election in 2019, most governors will too - and any improvements in Nigerians' lives will have come as much from their performance as from his.

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/>

First missing Nigerian girl found 2 years after Boko Haram kidnapping

May 18, 2016



The woman found this week is the first of more than 200 to return after being kidnapped by Boko Haram militants in April 2014. (Afolabi Sotunde/Reuters)

One of the teenagers kidnapped by Boko Haram extremists over two years ago from a boarding school in northeastern Nigeria has been found with a baby and was reunited Wednesday with her mother, a doctor said Wednesday — the first of the Chibok girls to be freed since the mass abduction.

The 19-year-old woman, described by an uncle as traumatized by her experience, was found wandering with her baby on Tuesday on the fringes of the remote Sambisa Forest, which is located near Nigeria's border with Cameroon.

The news gave hope to the families of the 218 girls who are still missing and may provide information as to their whereabouts. But the young woman told her mother that some of the Chibok girls have died in captivity and the others still are being held, according to her family's doctor, Idriss Danladi, who spoke to The Associated Press after talking with the mother.

Other Chibok girls may have been rescued by soldiers hunting down Boko Haram in the Sambisa Forest on Tuesday night, said Chibok community leader Pogu Bitrus, adding that he is working with officials to establish their identities. But it turned out later those girls were from another area, not the Chibok school, said Awami Nkeki, secretary of the Chibok local government council.

On April 14, 2014, Boko Haram stormed and fire-bombed the Government Girls Secondary School at Chibok and seized 276 girls preparing for science exams. Dozens managed to escape in the first hours, but 219 remained captive.
'God reigns'

The young woman is the first of those captives to be found since the kidnapping, which grabbed worldwide attention and put a spotlight on the violence of Nigeria's homegrown Islamic extremists.

"God reigns!" one of the founders of the Bring Back Our Girls movement, Oby Eze-kwesili, trumpeted on social media. "OUR #ChibokGirl ... IS BACK!!!!!! #218ShallBeBack because #HopeEndures."

There were conflicting accounts about how the young woman was found.

Danladi said the young woman, who was 17 when abducted, was found by hunters and taken with her baby to her home village of Mbalala, near Chibok, to be reunited with her mother. Her father died while she was in captivity, said her uncle, Yakubu Nkeki. All three were then brought to a military camp and arrived under military escort Wednesday night in Maiduguri, the biggest city in the northeast.

But Nigeria's military said it had rescued the young woman and her baby, along with a Boko Haram suspect who claimed to be her husband.

"This is to confirm that one of the abducted Chibok school girls ... was among the persons rescued by our troops," said the army spokesman, Col. Sani Kukasheka Usman.



Members of the #BringBackOurGirls campaign embrace each other at a sit-out in Abuja, Nigeria, on Wednesday. (Afolabi Sotunde/Reuters)

Danladi, who is from Chibok and has treated several of the parents, said the young woman's mother attempted suicide some months after her only child was seized.

The mother "suffered a huge traumatic disorder. ... I had to convince her that she just has to stay alive if she really wants her daughter returned home safe and sound," he said.

The Rev. Enoch Mark, whose two daughters are among the missing, said the news brought renewed hope to the parents of the Chibok girls.

"I believe that, by the grace of God, our daughters, some of them, will be found if they are still alive," he said.

At least 16 of the girls' parents have died since the kidnapping, Bitrus said, and others have ailments they blame on their ongoing trauma after the abductions.

"I suffered a stroke on Friday, that's why you don't recognize my voice," Mark said.
#BringBackOurGirls

The inability of Nigeria's government and military to rescue the girls led, in part, to last year's electoral defeat of President Goodluck Jonathan, who was seen as uncaring and not committed to freeing them.

The U.S., France and Britain offered help to find the girls, sending in drones, hostage negotiators, intelligence officers and others.

A social media campaign using the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls reached to the White House, where first lady Michelle Obama promised her husband would do all in his power to help. "Our prayers are with the missing Nigerian girls and their families. It's time to #BringBackOurGirls," she tweeted in May 2014.

R. Evon Idahosa, executive director of PathFinders Justice Initiative, which works on behalf of victims of child abuse, sex trafficking and rape, said the West has not done enough to help the Chibok girls.

Idahosa noted the response after the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, when government leaders marched "in solidarity, arm-in-arm over the death of 17 people. Not to say that that is any less important than the lives of these girls, but the reality is that one Western life definitely has a different value from the value of a girl in Nigeria."

Abducted children face stigma, rejection

Returning to ordinary life could be difficult for the victims, according to experts. "Children in this situation typically require medical assistance and psycho-social support to help them cope with what they have been through while they were in captivity," said UNICEF spokeswoman Helene Sandbu Ryeng.

"Our experience with children and women who were kidnapped by Boko Haram and freed by the military or escaped shows that they often face mistrust, stigma and rejection when they return to their communities," she said.

It's not known how many thousands of girls, boys and young women have been kidnapped by Boko Haram in a nearly seven-year-old insurgency that has killed some 20,000 people, forced more than two million from their homes and spread across Nigeria's borders.



A woman carrying a portrait of missing student Esther Ayuba attends a street protest campaigning for the rescue of abducted Chibok girls, in the Ikeja district of Lagos in Nigeria on April 14, 2016 - the two-year anniversary of the girls' abduction. (Akintunde Akinleye/Reuters)

Boko Haram held a large swath of northeastern Nigeria where it declared an Islamic caliphate in 2014. A multinational force from Nigeria and its neighbours has reduced their territory, reportedly hemming them into the Sambisa Forest. The insurgents have focused on attacking soft targets like markets and mosques with suicide bombers, often girls and young women who are feared to be among their captives.

There also are fears that Boko Haram is sending fighters to Libya to join the Islamic State group, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Saturday at a summit on fighting Boko Haram. The group declared itself the West Africa Province of IS last year, and Blinken's suggestion raised concern the two groups could start an extremist push into the vast and lawless lands of the Sahel region.

<http://www.cbc.ca/news/>

Somalia

Malgré l'affaiblissement des Chabab, la Somalie continue de se fragmenter

La Somalie est plus que jamais fragmentée à trois mois des élections présidentielles et législatives, initialement prévues pour août, mais dont la date officielle n'est pas encore fixée. Le gouvernement central de Mogadiscio n'a ni les moyens ni la légitimité pour reprendre le contrôle de son territoire, laissant des pans entiers sous la menace du groupe islamiste Chabab, affilié à Al-Qaïda. Dans ce contexte, le projet de fédéralisation de la Somalie, débuté en 2012 et censé redécouper le pays en six Etats membres, pourrait entériner le statu quo de cette géographie chaotique.



Solidement implantés au sud

La majeure partie des milices chabab, bien qu'affaiblies par les récentes offensives des drones américains, est retranchée au sud de la Somalie, dans la région du Jubaland. Le groupe terroriste y encercle la ville portuaire de Kismayo, reprise en 2012 par les forces de l'Amisom, la mission des Nations unies sur place, et perturbe l'accès à la frontière kenyane

Au nord de cette région, l'influence des milices se heurte aux contingents éthiopiens répartis le long de la frontière autour de la ville de Dolo Bay, mais l'implantation des Chabab dans les zones rurales autour de la base militaire de Baïdoa leur assure le

contrôle des routes qui mènent à Mogadiscio. Même en sous-nombre, les terroristes parviennent ainsi à perturber le ravitaillement des villes libérées, où l'armée somalienne est incapable de prendre le relais de l'Amisom et de tenir les garnisons.

Malgré d'importantes pertes humaines au cours des derniers mois, à commencer par celle de Hassan Ali Dhoore, l'un des chefs de l'organisation tué dans un raid américain, l'état des forces des Chabab reste incertain. Et la communication du gouvernement sur le sujet n'aide pas. Désireux de solliciter plus d'aides internationales, Mogadiscio parle de « résurgence » de l'organisation terroriste, quand les annonces successives de frappes de drones et d'offensives réussies de l'Amisom indiquent l'inverse. «Les Chabab agissent comme une organisation de guérilla classique. Ils sont en difficulté tant en termes d'effectifs que de moyens, ils n'ont plus la même force de frappe qu'il y a deux ans, donc ils se retirent, pour se reconstruire, dans ces zones où l'armée n'a pas accès. Ce n'est qu'une trêve», tranche E. J. Hogendoorn, directeur des missions de l'International Crisis Group en l'Afrique de l'Est.

Si les Chabab réussissent à perdurer dans cette partie du sud de la Somalie, c'est grâce à leur capacité de jouer sur l'impression d'isolement des clans. «Le traitement de faveur, analyse E. J. Hogendoorn, accordé par le gouvernement central de Mogadiscio au clan des Hawiyés, dont le président Hassan Cheik Mohamoud est issu, a généré beaucoup de tensions dans les autres régions du sud, proches de la capitale, où les clans ont eu l'impression d'être marginalisés. Les Chabab exploitent ce sentiment et confrontent les différentes ethnies pour s'imposer».

Sécuriser l'argent de Mogadiscio

Mais la conciliation des multiples minorités somaliennes n'est pas la priorité du gouvernement. Occupé à sa propre réélection, le président Cheikh Mohamoud tente de sécuriser Mogadiscio, canal d'accès aux aides internationales. Outil de légitimation pour le pouvoir, ce soutien financier de la communauté internationale est également la raison du discrédit du gouvernement vis-à-vis du reste du pays.

Avec le projet de fédéralisation, Mogadiscio pourrait indirectement renoncer à une partie de son territoire exposé à la menace des Chabab, à commencer par l'Interim Jubaland Administration, au sud du pays, où l'Amisom n'a pas les moyens de combattre les terroristes. «Le centre et le sud, du Galmudug jusqu'à la pointe du pays, fait un tiers de la France. Penser que l'on peut gérer une telle superficie avec 22 000 hommes serait incroyablement naïf», critique E. J. Hogendoorn.

Le Puntland, au nord-est du pays, autoproclamé autonome depuis 1998, est en proie à une lutte qui oppose forces gouvernementales, clans et Chabab. Ce qui en fait l'une des régions les plus instables du pays. «On pensait que le Somaliland était une exception, mais on va vers une fragmentation et une autonomisation croissante de ces régions. C'est presque comme si le gouvernement y renonçait avec le projet de fédéralisation. Mais, en même temps, il serait plus ridicule encore de continuer à prêcher pour l'Etat unique», commente Gérard Prunier, consultant spécialisé sur l'Afrique de l'Est.

Parade militaire et drapeaux dans les rues, la République du Somaliland fêtait cette semaine les vingt-cinq ans d'une indépendance qu'elle est la seule à reconnaître. La rupture avec le gouvernement central est actée depuis 1991. En quarantaine, coincé entre l'Ethiopie, Djibouti et le reste de la Somalie, elle est l'une des régions les plus

pauvres de la corne de l'Afrique. «Mais les deux tiers de la zone jouissent aujourd'hui d'une stabilité relative mais réelle en terme de sécurité. Aucune région en Somalie ne peut en dire autant», nuance Gérard Prunier. Dans le contexte actuel, le redécoupage des frontières internes pourraient s'avérer contreproductif et donner aux Chabab l'espace nécessaire pour se restructurer.

<http://www.pressafrik.com/>

REFUGEES SENDING 'SUITCASES OF WELFARE CASH' HOME TO SOMALIA

FBI 'won't touch it' for fear of offending Muslims



Men and women pulling “suitcases full of cash” started showing up at Seattle’s Sea-Tac Airport last year holding tickets for international flights bound for Africa.

Transporting large amounts of cash overseas is perfectly legal. But it was who was carrying the money ... and where it was going that caught the attention of law enforcement, according to a [report by KING 5](#), the local NBC affiliate for western Washington.

Those hauling the cash-laden cases were Somali-Americans who’d come to this country as refugees. They routinely send money back to Somalia. And many of the greenbacks headed to the jihadist-infested East African country come from welfare checks the refugees receive from the U.S. government, compliments of American taxpayers.

Carrying more than \$10,000 while traveling out of the United States is legal as long as the traveler declares it by filling out a one-page federal form.

It was while looking at these slips of paper that terrorism expert Glenn Kerns found a disturbing pattern.

“The thing was the amount, the staggering amount,” said Kerns, a Seattle police officer who was assigned to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force for 14 years before he retired in December.

The cash couriers were working for hawalas – businesses that derive their name from the Arabic word for “transfer.” Hawalas are part of a traditional system of banking in Shariah-compliant Muslim communities.

Seattle and King County are home to the fourth largest Somali community in the United States. More than 132,000 Somalis have come to the U.S. as “refugees” since 1983, with more than 60 percent arriving since the late 1990s.

The Somali refugees continue to arrive in the U.S. at a rate of 750 a month, placed in dozens of U.S. cities including Seattle, San Diego, Minneapolis, Atlanta, Lewiston, Maine; Fargo, North Dakota; Boise and Twin Falls, Idaho; and Columbus, Ohio, among other places.

Many use the hawalas to send money back to their families in Somalia.

But is all of it going to downtrodden family members?

That’s the question Kerns wanted the U.S. government to investigate.

It would make sense, since Somalia is home to an active jihadist rebellion from al-Shabab, an al-Qaida affiliate that slaughters Christians in neighboring Kenya and seeks to establish an ISIS-like caliphate in East Africa.

“(They) have Al Shabaab, which has been designated a terrorist organization, and our concern is how much money is going to them?” Kerns told KING 5.

<http://www.wnd.com/>

Le terrorisme, un faux ennemi, Alain Gresh*

24 MAI 2016

Donner la priorité à la politique et à la diplomatie pour tenter de résoudre les problèmes de la région qui alimentent une machine infernale.

Depuis les attentats contre Charlie-Hebdo en janvier 2015 et ceux de Paris du mois de novembre, domine un discours politique et médiatique qui, au lieu de faciliter la compréhension et donc la lutte contre la violence, brouille les esprits et tend à promouvoir « une guerre sans fin contre le terrorisme ». Pour corriger son premier ministre Manuel Valls qui avait évoqué une « guerre des civilisations », le président français François Hollande a préféré dire que nous étions dans un combat « pour la civilisation » ; la différence entre les deux formulations ? Valls semble considérer que « nos ennemis » font partie d'une autre civilisation et François Hollande qu'ils sont purement et simplement des barbares.



Alain Gresh

Déconstruire le concept de « terrorisme »

Celui-ci n'est ni une idéologie, ni un concept qui permet de définir un ennemi et donc de comprendre ses objectifs. Résistants ? Combattants de la liberté ? Délinquants ? Barbares ? On sait que le qualificatif de « terroriste » est toujours appliqué à l'autre, jamais à « nos combattants ».

L'histoire nous a aussi appris que, parfois, les terroristes d'hier peuvent devenir les dirigeants de demain.

Est-ce étonnant ? Le terrorisme est avant tout un mode d'action. Rien ne relie les groupes d'extrême droite italiens des années 1970, les Tigres tamouls et l'Armée républicaine irlandaise (Irish Republican Army, IRA), sans parler de l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP) et du Congrès national africain (African National Congress, ANC), ces deux derniers dénoncés comme « terroristes » par Ronald Reagan, par Margaret Thatcher et, bien sûr, par M. Benyamin Netanyahou, dont le pays collaborait étroitement avec l'Afrique du Sud de l'apartheid.

Au mieux, on peut inscrire le terrorisme dans la liste des moyens militaires. Et, comme on l'a dit souvent, il est l'arme des faibles. Figure brillante de la révolution algérienne, arrêté par l'armée française en 1957, Larbi Ben Mhidi, chef de la région autonome d'Alger, fut interrogé sur la raison pour laquelle le Front de libération nationale (FLN) déposait des bombes camouflées au fond de couffins dans les cafés ou dans les lieux publics. « Donnez-nous vos avions, nous vous donnerons nos couffins », rétorqua-t-il à ses tortionnaires, qui allaient l'assassiner froidement quelques

jours plus tard. La disproportion des moyens entre une guérilla et une armée régulière entraîne une disproportion du nombre des victimes. Si le Hamas et ses alliés doivent être considérés comme des « terroristes » pour avoir tué quelques civils pendant la guerre de Gaza de l'été 2014, comment faut-il qualifier l'État d'Israël, qui en a massacré, selon les estimations les plus basses — celles de l'armée israélienne elle-même —, entre huit cents et mille, dont plusieurs centaines d'enfants ?

L'usage du concept de terrorisme tend à dépolitiser les analyses et par là même à rendre impossible toute compréhension des problèmes soulevés. D'où les discours sur la nécessaire éradication du « Mal », d'un affrontement binaire.

L'islam d'aujourd'hui est différent d'un pays à un autre

Sommes-nous alors dans une « guerre de civilisations » ? Même si le concept est moins utilisé, il est sous-jacent : nous aurions affaire à un ennemi issu de « la civilisation musulmane » ou qui s'en réclame ; on trouverait au cœur de cette religion, supposée indivisible et immuable, tous les ingrédients qui ont permis aux tueurs d'agir à Paris ou à Bruxelles. On cherche dans le Coran ce qui pousserait à agir, on tend à réduire les musulmans à leur religion, on oublie les évolutions historiques qui font que l'islam d'aujourd'hui est bien différent d'un pays à un autre et bien différent aussi de ce qu'il était il y a un ou deux siècles. Certains réclament une réforme de l'islam, comme si c'était aux Occidentaux d'imposer leur vue, étrange vision d'une laïcité dont pourtant on n'arrête pas de se réclamer. En un mot, on « surislamise » le monde musulman : l'islam n'est pas une « grille d'analyse » globale qui nous permet de comprendre la logique et la stratégie du Hezbollah ou des Frères musulmans, de l'organisation de l'État islamique (OEI) ou de l'Arabie saoudite. Nous avons besoin de plus d'analyses politiques et moins d'exégèses du Coran, pourrait-on dire.

Cette essentialisation des musulmans, cette islamophobie imprègne désormais les médias et les responsables politiques et elle définit les grilles d'analyse simplificatrices d'un Orient compliqué. Elle est devenue le point de rencontre entre la gauche et la droite comme en témoigne la création du Printemps républicain. Elle permet de faire oublier à la fois les problèmes sociaux et raciaux en France et de créer une unité nationale factice contre ceux qui « nous haïssent ».

Ils haïssent nos libertés, c'est pour cela qu'ils nous attaquent disait le président George W. Bush au lendemain des attentats du 11-Septembre. Ils veulent nous empêcher de déguster de la bière sur les terrasses des cafés parisiens, écrivaient des commentateurs au lendemain du 13 novembre 2015. Ils sont mus simplement par la haine de « notre » civilisation, de « notre » mode de vie. Il n'est donc pas nécessaire d'interroger les politiques occidentales dans la région et de voir comment elles ont contribué à créer des monstres. Il n'est pas nécessaire de s'interroger sur les conséquences de la non-solution du problème palestinien et de la complicité occidentale avec Israël. Rap-pelons-le, Israël a refusé des années durant le dialogue avec l'OLP ; désormais elle, comme les Occidentaux refusent de parler au Hamas. Résultat : Al-Qaida commence à s'implanter en Palestine. Al-Qaida n'existait pas en Irak avant l'invasion de ce pays par les États-Unis en 2003 ; elle y est désormais implantée sous la forme de l'organisation de l'État islamique qui sévit aussi en Syrie.

Parler de la responsabilité des politiques impériales dans la région, évoquer les problèmes sociaux et les discriminations en France, amène le premier ministre à pré-

tendre que tenter d'expliquer c'est déjà justifier les poseurs de bombes. Mais comment combattre un ennemi si on ne le comprend pas ?

La lutte contre l'organisation de l'État islamique est une lutte de longue haleine. Elle devrait donner la priorité à la politique et à la diplomatie pour tenter de résoudre les problèmes de la région qui alimentent une machine infernale. D'un autre côté, elle devrait s'attaquer en France et en Europe aux discriminations sociales et raciales qui amènent une partie de nos concitoyens à douter de leur citoyenneté. Cela sera long et difficile ? Sans aucun doute. Mais quinze ans de « guerre contre le terrorisme » n'ont abouti qu'à plus de désastres au Proche-Orient, plus de violence en Europe et une restriction sans précédent des libertés démocratiques.

*Alain Gresh est journaliste. Il est directeur du journal en ligne Orient XXI.

La Revue du Projet n°57, mai 2016

<https://blogs.mediapart.fr/>

France

A Root Cause of Terrorism Is Not Religion

05/23/2016 11:03 am ET | Updated May 23, 2016

After jihadists slaughtered 132 people in a Paris nightclub, French ambassador Gérard Araud declared on *CNN*, “It is not because you are unemployed that you blow yourself up in a theater...the problem is radical Islam.” Yet, unemployment among Muslim youth is estimated by Eurostat to be 40 percent in France and 50 percent in Germany. Can there be any doubt that financial desperation—not religion—is handing terrorist recruiters a huge pool of potential foot soldiers?

To cut recruiters off at the knees, the United States must encourage its allies to commit to new strategies to integrate Muslim youth into their economies. According to Brandeis professor Andrew Hahn, “Studies demonstrate that entrepreneurship education programs are among the few strategies that work during periods of massive youth joblessness,”

We blame religion and ignore the economic underpinnings of terrorism at our peril. We can fight back with entrepreneurship education, and initiatives that will encourage a worldwide entrepreneurial eco-system to take root, instead of poisonous ideologies.

An Historic Pattern: Youth Unemployment Leads to War

Viewed historically, it is no surprise that high rates of youth unemployment could lead to shocking acts of violence. In “The Bachelor Bomb: This Lost Generation of Young Men is Threatening Global Stability”, *Quartz* editor Gwynn Guilford explores the close relationship between surging populations of underemployed young men and revolutions or wars. Clear examples she cites include the English Revolution (1642-51), the French Revolution of 1789, and the emergence of the Nazi Party in the 1930s.

Since 2005, France has suffered through a series of youth riots ignited by rage over unemployment and discrimination. In her 2007 paper for the Institute For Social Policy And Understanding, “Muslims in France: French or Muslim, What Is the Choice?” Moushumi Khan argued that the riots exploded out of French Muslim frustration at “not getting rights of equal citizenship—including employment.” Khan added: “The degree of misinformation and prejudice about Muslims in Europe clouds any examination of the underlying reasons for social unrest.”



[Youth Riots in Sarcelles, France](#)

Studies Prove Entrepreneurship Education Changes Minds

When I began teaching in New York City's public high schools in 1982, I was only able to reach my angry, disenfranchised low-income students when I started teaching them about business. Once I started using business lessons to get their attention, I discovered that they coped exceptionally well with the stress of business risk. They were eager to learn how to make money, and worked hard with great enthusiasm once they were shown how to create and run their own small businesses. They became interested in improving their math, reading and writing skills because these helped them run their businesses, and were less likely to drop out.

But I couldn't prove it.

Luckily, starting in 1997, Brandeis and Harvard University partnered with the Network for Teaching Entrepreneurship (NFTE) for two decades to conduct the first-ever double-blind studies on the effect of entrepreneurship education on low-income youth. The studies showed that students exposed to entrepreneurship education developed:

- A 32% increase in attending college.
- A 4X increase in occupational aspirations.
- Three times as many new businesses as the control group.

The Harvard study also concluded that students learned critical thinking and collaboration skills which created a "psychology of entrepreneurship" and made them stronger candidates for employment.

France Begins Entrepreneurship Education Initiative

Education is a priority in France, with 21 percent of the annual national budget earmarked for it, yet according to the French Council of Economic Analysis, roughly 150,000 young people drop out of school annually.


In 2014, France recognized entrepreneurship education as a “cross-curricular objective at all levels of school education,” according to School Education Gateways’ report “Entrepreneurship Education in France.” France has begun to add entrepreneurship objectives into the national curriculum and target Junior Achievement (Entreprendre pour Apprendre) programs to low-income youth. These initiatives are small, yet encouraging.

Sub-Sahara’s Entrepreneurship Boom

Meanwhile, the 2014 and 2016 GEM Global Reports—the world’s largest entrepreneurship study—found burgeoning entrepreneurial activity in the world’s poorest economies. Ten sub-Saharan economies—Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia—are “in the midst of an entrepreneurial revolution that is invigorating the region with new opportunities, increased employment, and a robust rise in gross domestic product,” according to GEM.

American foreign policymakers need to be aware of this activity. We and our allies can help encourage entrepreneurial eco-systems to take root in Nigeria, for example, to help low-income youth resist the lure of Boko Haram and other violent extremist groups

The GEM Report found “an incredible ability for people here to create their own jobs, and in many cases, jobs for others,” adding, “entrepreneurship in sub-Saharan Africa can contribute substantially toward providing income for families and lifting communities out of poverty.”



Total Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA), from CNN “African Start-Ups”

5 Initiatives to Connect Entrepreneurs Globally

I propose that the United States take the lead in establishing five international initiatives to connect entrepreneurs to markets and financing, and promote entrepreneurship as a viable path out of poverty for low-income youth.

The estimated total annual cost of these initiatives is around \$100 million, which pales in comparison to the billions spent on the War on Terror. Potential sponsors include not only national governments, but also the World Economic Forum and major corporations.

1. International business plan competition

The top ten young entrepreneurs under age forty from 250 countries worldwide would be honored at an award ceremony and networking event in a different city annually. Estimated annual cost: \$15 million

2. Worldwide venture capital fund for young entrepreneurs

If 200 countries each choose 250 entrepreneurs to receive \$1,000 grants to start their businesses, the total capital required per year would be \$50 million globally. That is a small amount to invest compared to the social benefits of building a new generation of entrepreneurs.

3. Global expansion of Ernst & Young U.S. Young Entrepreneur of the Year Awards

Estimated cost \$5 million.

4. Free apps to connect entrepreneurs to markets globally

These would enable a small farmer in Syria, for example, to find importers in Europe for his dates. Estimated annual cost \$10 million.

5. International Internet/television series profiling young entrepreneurs

This would promote award winners and tell their stories. Estimated cost \$20 million

<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/>

Iraq

[ISIS: The Business of Terror](#)

Exclusive: ISIS makes up for lost oil cash with rising taxes and fees

May 31, 2016

Despite the constant airstrikes on its oil infrastructure, ISIS still has a \$2 billion empire -- and it's making up lost revenue by squeezing the population under its control through rising taxes.

That's according to new research from the Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, which will release on Wednesday a new report on the finances of the Islamic State.

The authors of the report, terrorism experts Jean-Charles Brisard and Damien Martinez, conclude that "ISIS's military defeat is not imminent... as things stand, [ISIS economic collapse](#) remains some way off in the mid-term."

It says ISIS made \$2.4 billion in 2015. That's a \$500 million drop from the center's revenue estimate the previous year, but [ISIS remains the richest terrorist organization on the planet](#).

The main reason ISIS is still making billions is taxes. The Islamic State's extortion of the people living inside its territory in Iraq and Syria has skyrocketed from \$360 million in 2014 to \$800 million in 2015, according to researchers.

The report is a sobering take on what has been an image of ISIS as a terrorist organization in disarray. In recent months, [ISIS has cut fighter salaries in half](#) and [a non-stop bombing campaign has cut its oil production](#).

It has also lost 40% of its territory, according to the U.S. military, but ISIS still has about 8 million people under its control.


Brisard and Martinez say that ISIS has simply adjusted its business from oil to taxes. As oil fell from 38% to 25% of its revenue stream last year, ISIS cranked up its extortion racket. In 2015, taxes went from supplying 12% of yearly ISIS revenue to 33%.

Those taxes include a 10% income tax, up to 15% business tax, road tolls, 5% fees for bank cash withdrawals, and up to 35% taxes on pharmaceutical drugs. There are also fees for leaving the territory, even temporarily. And there's a special tax on Christians, mafia-like "protection insurance" called *jizyah*. The Islamic State's official magazine proudly speaks of "imposing jizyah."

ISIS says all taxes are zakat, Islamic religious alms similar to tithing.

"It's really an adaptive organization," Brisard told CNNMoney. "What strikes me is the fact that they're clearly behaving as managers, not simple looters. They really

have budget requirements, and they're compensating."



But the U.S. Treasury Department said the coalition's effort to disrupt the Islamic State's economy is working. The group is also known as ISIS and ISIL.

"We are seeing progress... since late-2015, ISIL's production of oil has declined by about 30%. Their ability to generate revenue has been reduced by at least that much," Treasury said.

This particular research tends to give higher revenue estimates than those provided by other experts. For example, it says ISIS made \$600 million from oil last year while the U.S. Treasury has previously estimated that it's closer to \$500 million.

But several other terrorism experts say the main conclusions are still accurate: ISIS has flipped its budget.

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy will publish a report next week that details how ISIS has come to rely on taxes to fund its terror. Christina Schori Liang, a terrorism analyst there, said that ISIS is eyeing illicit profits from cybercrime as the next frontier. [It's harder to track](#), allows for the use of digital currencies like [Bitcoin](#), and doesn't abide by international banking regulations.

Report criticizes ineffective war on ISIS

The report by the Center for the Analysis of Terrorism claims that ISIS still has an immense trade with the outside world, because the United Nations has failed to close off its territory with a formal embargo, and American coalition airstrikes have limited impact on the economy.

Brisard acknowledged that airstrikes have destroyed much of the Islamic State's oil-producing infrastructure. But he said the only way to truly cut ISIS funding is to recapture the territory it controls.



ISIS is besieged on several sides by troops from the Russian-backed Syrian government, U.S.-backed Kurds and other rebel factions, but the United States and Russia have shown no indication they are willing to commit their own military forces.

What surprises Brisard the most, however, is that the countries sitting on the UN Security Council can't agree to an embargo that punishes countries that continue buying cement, wheat, oil, phosphate and other products from ISIS territory.

For example, research estimates that ISIS sold 12,000 tons of cotton last year -- mostly to buyers in Turkey.

"The current situation is absurd," Brisard said.

<http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/31/news/isis-oil-taxes/>

Yes, ISIS Is Losing in Iraq. No, It's Not in Its Death Throes.

MAY 17, 2016

BAGHDAD — Another day brought another horrible set of headlines out of Baghdad: On Tuesday, four bombings, one after another, killed dozens of people and left streaks of blood and strewn body parts across public markets.

As familiar as the [last week](#) of violence in Baghdad — more than 200 killed since last [Wednesday](#) — might seem to those who have watched [Iraq](#) over the years, this is not business as usual here. The American history in Iraq tells us that successful bombings in Baghdad are not to be taken lightly.

The official talking points say the new wave of bombings is a sign that the Islamic State is losing. The terrorists are lashing out in Baghdad because they are abandoning territory to pro-Iraqi ground forces and American-led airstrikes. They're "on the defensive," as Brett McGurk, President Obama's special envoy here, said recently.

There is truth to that line. The Islamic State, also known as [ISIS](#) or ISIL, is losing territory in Iraq and Syria. And the recent wave of bombings is out of the very first page in the group's playbook, back when the Islamic State was Al Qaeda in Iraq. But this is not the group's final death throes — not yet.

Since their beginnings, the Sunni extremists of the Islamic State have been driven by the desire to wage a sectarian holy war, and have been amply willing to barter their lives in return for terrorizing and inciting the Shiite population. And the Iraqi capital has always been its most fertile ground for sowing fear.

We have seen the results of this kind of calculated violence before.

An onslaught of such attacks by Al Qaeda in Iraq in 2006 and 2007 was ultimately responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American soldiers and Marines, and of thousands of Iraqi Shiites. Security fears among everyday Iraqi Shiites gave rise to an era of militia dominance, and to Shiite death squads hunting on the streets of Baghdad, perhaps forever altering the city's demographics.


The civil war that erupted hardened the country's sectarian divisions, and it empowered Shiite political leaders like Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, who as prime minister set on a path of ejecting Iraqi Sunnis from public life.

Al Qaeda in Iraq was decimated but not destroyed, and Mr. Obama declared the American war in Iraq over in 2011.

INTERACTIVE GRAPHIC

A Week of Terror Attacks in Baghdad That Killed Hundreds

Terrorists killed more than 200 people in a surge of bombings across Baghdad over the past week.



[OPEN INTERACTIVE GRAPHIC](#)

But in 2013, another intense wave of bombings by Sunni extremist hit Baghdad, and other cities, with 50 suicide attacks in one month alone. Sunni grudges against the government had deepened with every summary execution, and every mass arrest. When the Islamic State came roaring through the Sunni countryside in 2014, many Iraqi Sunnis were willing to give them a chance, seeing the jihadists as a potential answering force to years of Shiite abuse.

And it brought American forces back, too, in the form of thousands of military advisers and Special Operations forces leading the territorial fight against the Islamic State. The war had not ended in 2011, it was starting a new phase.

Now, the Islamic State's turf is being rolled back in Anbar Province and eastern Syria. But even with those positive headlines, and with Western support of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's halting efforts to include Sunnis in government and the security services, one fear here is that the new violence in Baghdad will again change the conversation.

The Islamic State, in doing what it does best by carrying out mass killings of Shiites across Baghdad, is already lending momentum to harder-line Iraqi Shiite leaders — those who answer to Iran and seek more divisions with Sunnis.

It's also important to remember that the situation in Baghdad and the territorial fight against the Islamic State in other provinces are related.

The reflex of the Shiite leadership is to protect Baghdad — to answer the agonized voices of victims of terrorism — and that is likely to prompt calls for military and police units to be pulled from the front lines to secure the capital. In that way, the resurgent terrorist threat in Baghdad could begin stalling the improving military pushes outside the city — including efforts to finally direct an offensive toward re-taking Mosul, the main city in the north.

At bomb scenes in Baghdad over the past week, survivors lashed out at politicians and said militias should protect them if the government cannot.

Fadhil Lateef, is a 45-year-old man who sells fruits and vegetables in Sadr City, a teeming Shiite district in northeastern Baghdad that was hit by a suicide bombing last week and another one on Tuesday. He said he saw four burning bodies sitting in a car, a sight that terrified his small children.

“I wonder when this bloodshed stops,” he said. “If the government is not able to protect us, then let the Peace Brigades protect the areas of east Baghdad.”



Sadr City, a teeming Shiite district in northeastern Baghdad, was one of the four areas hit by suicide bombing attacks on Tuesday that killed 80 people. Credit Khalid Al-Mousily/Reuters

The Peace Brigades is the latest name for the militia controlled by the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr that under its old name — the Mahdi Army — fought the Americans and was blamed for atrocities during the sectarian civil war.

Talking to Baghdad residents who remember the past waves of violence offers a very different set of priorities from those voiced by American officials.

For the Shiites here, the military gains celebrated by American officials — pushing the Islamic State out of territory, such as Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Province, and Tikrit — are harbingers of familiar terrors. And some would even prefer that the Islamic State continue reigning in the Sunni-dominated territories of its so-called caliphate if it means it leaves Baghdad alone.

Some of the calmest times in Baghdad in the last decade and more came after the Islamic State swept across northern Iraq in 2014 and seized Mosul and, seemingly, focused on its brutal state-building project rather than guerrilla terrorism.

In Baghdad, blast walls came down, many traffic checkpoints disappeared, and years of nighttime curfews came to an end. Everyone, it seemed, felt a little less dread at being in public.

When there were attacks, they seemed to galvanize a sense of broad public mourning that is largely absent when violence is as widespread as it has been in the last week.

Karim Wasfi, the conductor of the Iraqi National Symphony, began showing up at bombing scenes, playing his cello. People lit candles and placed flowers.

Those scenes evoked the public reaction in places like Paris or Brussels where terror attacks are extraordinary events. In a country where bombings had once become so routine that, often, shops struck in the morning were often reopened by afternoon, the attacks had actually begun seeming out of place.

They are becoming familiar again: 80 dead across four neighborhoods on Tuesday, almost 100 killed last Wednesday. The old mix of grief, anger and despair permeated the streets today.

Mohammad Sami, 32, survived the Sadr City market bombing with wounds to his hands and neck. His sense of loss was deeper:

“How long do we have to keep suffering from this misery?”

Correction: May 18, 2016

Because of an editing error, an earlier version of this article carried an erroneous dateline. Tim Arango reported from Istanbul, not Baghdad.

<http://www.nytimes.com/>

Analysis: Raqqa, Fallujah Operations; US Agreement with ISIS Terrorists

May 29, 2016

Analysis: Raqqa, Fallujah Operations; US Agreement with ISIS Terrorists



AhlulBayt News Agency - The operation to recapture the ISIS-held city of Fallujah was started on last Monday with an order given by the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. The military and popular units moved towards the assault sites in Fallujah from the three eastern, southern and northern sides.

At the same time, the word spread that there have been an agreement between the two fighting sides on liberation of the city. The Saudi ambassador to Baghdad has met with Iraqi minister of defense, pledging on behalf of ISIS' command that the terror group would pull out of the city. In return, Al-Abadi's government vowed to direct the Fallujah recapture operation with a consideration of ISIS' "specific conditions."

At the same time, there are reports claiming the operation to liberate Syria's Raqqa has started in the north of the province as an outcome of American-Kurdish cooperation, with the US commanding the assault and the Kurdish forces performing the mission. This comes while the Kurds are seen to be unable to start battle with ISIS in Raqqa without designing a convenient fight plan just like that of the Iraqis.

There are some significant points concerning the two operations in Syria and Iraq:

- In Iraq, concerning fight against ISIS two models of operation have been experienced. First, the model in which the Public Mobilization Forces took the initiative in liberation operations of Babil, Salahaddin, Kirkuk and Diyala provinces. Second, the model in which the US air force's strikes had a hand in liberation of Ramadi city. The first model of operation was launched after provision of accurate data of the whereabouts of the militants of ISIS. In this model the positions of the terror group were brought under Iraqi forces' fire, and an attack of the places ensued. The last

stage was cleansing the areas of the terror militants. In this model, the damage to the civilians, the militants and houses was at a minimum. At least four Iraqi provinces were entirely liberated using this model of recapture operations. Following the operations, the evacuated people returned to their houses.

The second model of recapture operations- implemented in Ramadi- was a heavy bombing process during which the city majorly was reduced to rubble, with “no living thing being able to survive at the operation sites.” In this model, the fatality of the operators is almost zero, however, the civilian tolls could touch 100 percent. Thereby, the US forces, following recapture of Ramadi, have failed to boast of a “liberated city” because there was no sound city left behind.

- As a result of the first and second type recapture operations, the ISIS’ commanders have concluded that they no longer could save their held areas once a recapture operation was launched. So, during the past few months ISIS saw a considerable decline of its combat strength, as there grew divides among the commanders of the terror group. This comes while after arrival of ISIS to northwestern Iraq and northeastern Syria, and after the group reached a kind of stability, due to the long distance of the ISIS-held areas from the Iraqi and Syria capitals, the Iraq and Syrian governments dropped out an immediate battle against ISIS as a priority because in military terms the “crisis” was reduced to a “problem.” Meanwhile, ISIS rose to be Washington’s top priority; why?

- The US Democrat Party has an opportunity until November this year to make a trump card out of “victory over ISIS.” Let’s assume that emergence of terrorism has nothing to do with the American intelligence services and let’s assume that existence of ISIS terrorist group is not dependent on the US logistic supports, but the “anti-terrorism” slogan is American in nature; the question is what has President Barack Obama’s administration done to destroy ISIS’ strength?

In discussion of terrorism in Syria and Iraq, we are in front of two relatively weak and strong camps. The stronger camp is al-Nusra Front which presently holds parts of Aleppo, Daraa, As-Suwayda, Quneitra, and full province of Idlib, though it failed to connect these areas despite a lot of efforts, and to make out of them an encircled area. Limited only to Syria, al-Nusra Front stands in a better position than ISIS in terms of size, quality and the degree of domesticity. It has created tens of active offshoots like Ahrar ash-Sham, Fatah al-Islam, Jaish al-Fatah, Jaysh al-Islam and Faylaq ash-Sham in an array of Syrian regions. The terrorist military alliance has treated the people in a way to help win a relative support of inhabitants of regions under its control. Therefore, it is not easy for the US to take on such a militant group.

On the other side is ISIS which is not multiplied, and all of ISIS is what we see in its official organization. A majority of its fighters are non-natives, with the European nationals bigger in number than the Asians. However, one third of its forces are native Syrians but they are not given command posts. Just unlike al-Nusra Front, ISIS has two large weak spots: existence of hundreds of Ba'athists in its top ranks which have made the group a secular group, and domination of Saudi regime and Turkey over it.

With these descriptions, Obama’s policy to prove success of counter-terrorism poli-

cy is completely clear. The US should not take on al-Nusra Front and its affiliates because it is unlikely to make gains, so it must focus on ISIS and its linchpins, namely the Ba'athists, the Saudi dollars and the Turkish intelligence in a bid to show off, through “covert accord and overt combat”, success over terrorism in Iraq and Syria. These days’ Raqqa recapture operation could be decoded and figured out using this American intention.

- As earlier was noted, almost two weeks ago the Saudi ambassador to Iraq met the Iraqi defense minister and said that should the army forces as well as the Public Mobilization Forces accepted not to battle ISIS, he would promise in behalf of the terror group that the terrorists would show no resistance to Fallujah recapture operation. The two sides agreed that the firepower of the Iraqi forces would not exceed three kilometers so that ISIS could gradually prepare Fallujah areas for hand-over.

Since Monday, the day of onset of Fallujah operation from western, southern and northern sides of the city, at least 30 villages were retaken. The Iraqi forces faced no considerable resistance by the terrorist group, and it is exactly for this reason that Iraq’s PM al-Abadi has said that Fallujah would fall to government forces within two days. This comes while Fallujah, larger than the center of Al Anbar province Ramadi, during the past 13 years has stood as a stronghold of terrorism in Iraq. The US military has lost thousands of its troops in the city, but failed to make gains. Also, the Iraqi army has launched over 10 recapture operation, but also met with failure. The question now presents itself: How the Iraqi forces are now moved ahead and confidently talk about defeat of ISIS in Fallujah within days?

In Syria the job is done with the same quality, though with different characteristics. The Syrian Kurds, led by Salih Muslim, are a weak camp and earlier failed to take a major role in liberation of Kobani north of Syria, but now have undertaken a much bigger duty: recapture of Raqqa, a relatively large city and ISIS’ stronghold in Syria.

It is clear that any advances in Raqqa front is not a genuine progress made by military strength, rather, it would be an outcome of US-ISIS deal. The Kurdish fighters of Democratic union Party (PYD) have been given guarantees that there would be no real conflict with ISIS before they approved of launching an operation against ISIS’ hotbed Raqqa

- Even regardless of Democrat Party’s plan for the US presidential election, Washington is weighing up a new scenario for Damascus and Baghdad: operational military presence in Syria and Iraq and shifting from a distant player to a close and active player.

Earlier, the US had made agreement with the Afghan government to station on standby 16,000 US combat forces in such military bases as Bagram Airfield. The same scenario is being followed in Syria and Iraq. If the US manages to set up operational military bases in both Iraq’s west and Syria’s east, which are mostly inhabited by Sunnis, it could, by connecting its military bases from Turkey to India, build a strong cross-border security zone, and more importantly jeopardize and impair the security conditions of other countries, specifically Russia and Iran, all to transform, from an enervating player, into a player holding sensitive positions.

But, are all these simply talks? No, they are right, but the others (the rivals) would not stay actionless until the US scenario is accomplished. Washington's strategic mistake is that it imagines that others' hands are tied.

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Syria

Al Qaeda Turns to Syria, With a Plan to Challenge ISIS

MAY 15, 2016



The Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri in a 2011 image provided by the SITE Intelligence Group. He seemed to clear the way this month for Qaeda figures to use the group's Syrian affiliate, the Nusra Front, to form an emirate there.

WASHINGTON — [Al Qaeda](#)'s top leadership in [Pakistan](#), badly weakened after a decade of C.I.A. drone strikes, has decided that the terror group's future lies in [Syria](#) and has secretly dispatched more than a dozen of its most seasoned veterans there, according to senior American and European intelligence and counterterrorism officials.

The movement of the senior Qaeda jihadists reflects Syria's growing importance to the terrorist organization and most likely foreshadows an escalation of the group's bloody rivalry with the Islamic State, Western officials say.

The operatives have been told to start the process of creating an alternate headquarters in Syria and lay the groundwork for possibly establishing an emirate through Al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, the Nusra Front, to compete with the Islamic State, from which Nusra broke in 2013. This would be a significant shift for Al Qaeda and its

affiliate, which have resisted creating an emirate, or formal sovereign state, until they deem conditions on the ground are ready. Such an entity could also pose a heightened terrorist threat to the United States and Europe.

Qaeda operatives have moved in and out of Syria for years. [Ayman al-Zawahri](#), the group's supreme leader in Pakistan, dispatched senior jihadists to bolster the Nusra Front in 2013. A year later, Mr. Zawahri sent to Syria a shadowy Qaeda cell called Khorasan that American officials say has been plotting attacks against the West.

But establishing a more enduring presence in Syria would present the group with an invaluable opportunity, Western analysts said. A Syria-based Qaeda state would not only be within closer striking distance of Europe but also benefit from the recruiting and logistical support of fighters from Iraq, Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.

Mr. Zawahri released his first audio statement in several months in early May, and it seemed to clear the way for the Qaeda figures to use the Nusra Front to form an emirate in Syria with his blessing. Some Nusra leaders, however, oppose the timing of such a move, so the affiliate has not yet taken that step.

"The combination of an Al Qaeda emirate and a revitalized Al Qaeda central leadership in northern Syria would represent a confidence boost for the jihadi organization's global brand," Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, [wrote this month in Foreign Policy](#).

"Al Qaeda would present itself as the smart, methodical and persistent jihadi movement that, in contrast to the Islamic State, had adopted a strategy more aligned with everyday Sunni Muslims," Mr. Lister wrote.

Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have the same ultimate objective to create an Islamic state, but they have used different tactics, Mr. Lister and other scholars said. The Islamic State moved quickly to impose harsh, unilateral control over territory in Iraq and Syria and declare its independence. The Nusra Front has painstakingly sought to build influence over areas it wants to control and with other Syrian rebel groups opposed to the government of President Bashar al-Assad.

American officials say the Islamic State has largely eclipsed Al Qaeda in the global jihadist hierarchy, with Al Qaeda hemorrhaging members to its more brutal and media-savvy rival. Many of the Khorasan operatives, including their leader, Muhsin al-Fadhli, have been killed in eight American airstrikes in northwest Syria since September 2014.

The Islamic State has between 19,000 and 25,000 fighters, roughly divided between Iraq and Syria, American intelligence analysts estimate. The Nusra Front has about 5,000 to 10,000 fighters, all in Syria. An emirate would differ from the Islamic State caliphate in the scale of its ambition, in that a Nusra emirate would not claim to be a government for all the world's Muslims.

Some senior American and European intelligence and law enforcement officials say the small but steady movement of important Qaeda operatives and planners to Syria

is a desperate dash to a haven situated perilously in the middle of the country's chaos. These officials say Qaeda operatives in Syria are determined but largely contained.

"There's always been a steady trickle, and it remains," said Col. Steve Warren, a military spokesman in Baghdad for the American-led campaign in Iraq and Syria.

Nonetheless, the presence of a senior cadre of experienced Qaeda leaders in Syria — some with multimillion-dollar American bounties on their heads — has raised alarms in Washington as well as in the allied capitals of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.

"We have destroyed a large part of Al Qaeda," John O. Brennan, the director of the C.I.A., said this month on NBC's "Meet the Press." "It is not completely eliminated, so we have to stay focused on what it can do."

The evolving assessment about Al Qaeda and the Nusra Front in Syria comes from interviews with nearly a dozen American and European intelligence and counterterrorism officials and independent analysts, most of whom have been briefed on confidential information gleaned from spies and electronic eavesdropping. They also analyzed the public statements and social media commentary among Qaeda and Nusra Front members.

One of the operatives Western intelligence officials are focused most intently on is Saif al-Adl, a senior member of Al Qaeda's ruling body, known as the Shura Council, who oversaw the organization immediately after Osama bin Laden was killed by Navy SEALs in Pakistan in 2011. It is unclear whether Mr. Adl is in Syria, North Africa or somewhere else, American intelligence officials said.

The government of Iran released Mr. Adl and four other senior members of Al Qaeda early last year as part of a secret prisoner swap with Al Qaeda's branch in Yemen, the group holding an Iranian diplomat, Nour Ahmad Nikbakht.

Mr. Adl, a former colonel in the Egyptian military who is believed to be in his 50s, is listed on the [F.B.I.'s Most Wanted Terrorist list](#) and was indicted in the 1998 United States Embassy bombings in East Africa. He is the subject of a \$5 million [American bounty](#).

"As a senior adviser to Al Qaeda's networks in Syria and proximate environs, al-Adl could be especially useful in helping to define strategies that will help the group achieve confidence-inspiring successes," said Michael S. Smith II of Kronos Advisory, a terrorism research and analysis firm.

The other four men released by Iran are also suspected of being in Syria. They are Abdul Khayr al-Misri, an Egyptian who formerly led Al Qaeda's foreign relations council; Abul Qassam, a Jordanian who was a deputy to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of the organization that later became the Islamic State; Sari Shibab, a Jordanian operative; and Abu Mohamed al-Misri, an Egyptian who helped orchestrate Al Qaeda's major attacks before Sept. 11, 2001, according to American officials briefed on details of the transfer. They agreed to discuss the matter on condition of anonymity because of the issue's confidential nature.

It is unclear how and when Al Qaeda might form an emirate in Syria that would hold territory and most likely harden its position toward more moderate Syrian opposition groups. The Nusra Front was created in 2012 as an offshoot of Al Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq — which under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi later declared itself the Islamic State — to fight Mr. Assad's government. That same year, the United States designated the Nusra Front as a terrorist organization.

But in 2013, the Nusra Front balked at joining Mr. Baghdadi when he announced the creation of the Islamic State, also known as [ISIS](#) or ISIL, and instead pledged allegiance to Mr. Zawahri in Pakistan. This ignited an often bloody rivalry between Nusra and Islamic State fighters in Syria.

Now Al Qaeda's top leadership is looking to stanch its losses in Pakistan and score a propaganda coup in Syria by establishing a formal emirate. A portion of Nusra's leadership, however, supports continuing the group's more pragmatic strategy of cultivating local support.

"The fundamental disagreement is over how far Al Qaeda's long-game strategy should be sustained before revealing more and more of Nusra's real face and solidifying territorial control through the formation of an emirate," Mr. Lister said in an interview.

Many of the Syrian rebel groups that are fighting alongside Nusra against Mr. Assad's government reject the idea of forming an emirate, fearing it would further splinter the opposition to Mr. Assad.

"From Al Qaeda's religious perspective, the declaration of a state or of an emirate should only happen in a context where it is possible to govern effectively," said Firas Abi Ali, a senior principal analyst with IHS Country Risk in London. "It would be ironic for Al Qaeda to declare an emirate while there's a caliphate that it rejects."

<http://www.nytimes.com/>

Washington ne veut pas mener des frappes communes avec la Russie

20/05/2016

Ces frappes coordonnées doivent viser les groupes « terroristes » dont le Front Al-Nosra, branche syrienne d'Al-Qaïda. - *AP/SIPA*

Moscou a proposé aux Etats-Unis de mener des frappes aériennes ensemble contre les « groupes terroristes » actifs en Syrie à partir du 25 mai. Une proposition écartée par Washington.

« Nous ne collaborons pas et nous ne nous coordonnons pas avec les Russes », a indiqué le capitaine de vaisseau Jeff Davis, le porte-parole du Pentagone. Une réponse sans équivoque par rapport à la proposition de mener des frappes aériennes conjointes avec les Etats-Unis à partir du 25 mai contre des « groupes terroristes » actifs en Syrie effectuée un peu plus tôt dans la journée par Moscou.



« Nous proposons aux Etats-Unis (...) que les forces aériennes russes et l'aviation de la coalition menée par les Etats-Unis commencent à partir du 25 mai à planifier et effectuer ensemble des frappes aériennes » visant **les groupes « terroristes »** dont le Front Al-Nosra, branche syrienne d'Al-Qaïda, a déclaré Sergueï Choïgou, le ministre russe de la Défense, lors d'une réunion à Moscou, diffusée en direct par la télévision publique.

Ces frappes coordonnées doivent également viser les groupes armés illégaux qui ne soutiennent pas le cessez-le-feu instauré en Syrie depuis le 27 février, ainsi que les groupes armés et les « caravanes transportant des armes et des munitions qui traversent illégalement la frontière turco-syrienne », a-t-il indiqué.

Vers une opposition de la Turquie

La Turquie, membre de l'Otan, qui participe à la coalition internationale menée par les Etats-Unis, devrait a priori s'opposer à des frappes visant sa zone frontalière.

La Russie se réserve par ailleurs « le droit de mener unilatéralement des frappes » à partir du 25 mai contre les détachements des groupes terroristes et les groupes armés illégaux qui ne respectent pas le cessez-le-feu », a précisé Sergueï Choïgou.

La Russie et les Etats-Unis se sont engagés début mai à « redoubler d'efforts » pour aboutir à un règlement politique du conflit syrien et étendre le cessez-le-feu sur tout le territoire syrien.

Un cessez le feu globalement respecté

Moscou et Washington, qui co-président le groupe de soutien international à la Syrie (GISS, 17 pays), pilotent le dossier et le contrôle du cessez-le-feu, instauré sous leur impulsion le 27 février et globalement respecté.

Les groupes jihadistes comme l'Etat islamique (EI) sont toutefois exclus de la trêve décrétée en Syrie afin de favoriser des pourparlers entre le régime de Damas et les rebelles pour mettre fin à un conflit complexe qui dure depuis cinq ans et a fait plus de 270.000 morts.

<http://www.lesechos.fr/>

Islamic State greatest global threat: US report

Though Islamic State lost significant territory in Iraq and Syria during the second half of 2015



The Islamic State terror group remained the greatest threat globally in 2015, maintaining a formidable force in Iraq and Syria, including a large number of foreign terrorist fighters, a US report said today.

IS' capacity and territorial control in Iraq and Syria reached a high point in spring 2015, but began to erode over the second half of 2015, the State Department said in its annual Country Reports on Terrorism 2015.

"IS did not have a significant battlefield victory in Iraq and Syria after May. At the end of 2015, 40% of the territory IS controlled at the beginning of the year had been liberated, it said in its annual Congress-mandated report.

In Syria, local forces expelled ISIL fighters from several key cities along the routes connecting the two IS strongholds of Raqqa and Mosul, and reclaimed about 11% of the territory IS once controlled.

These losses demonstrated the power of coordinated government action to mobilize against and confront terrorism, it said.

Despite this, IS "remained the greatest threat globally, maintaining a formidable force in Iraq and Syria, including a large number of foreign terrorist fighters," it said.

Noting that IS' loss of territory in Iraq and Syria in 2015 diminished its availability

of fund, the State Department said the terrorist organization relied heavily on extortion and the levying of "taxes" on local populations under its control, as well as a range of other sources, such as oil smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, looting, antiquities theft and smuggling, foreign donations, and human trafficking.

Coalition airstrikes targeted IS' energy infrastructure modular refineries, petroleum storage tanks, and crude oil collection points as well as bulk cash storage sites.

"These airstrikes have significantly degraded IS' ability to generate revenue. The United States led the international effort, including through the UN, to confront IS' oil smuggling and its antiquities dealing, delivering additional blows to its financial infrastructure," it said.

Along with IS, al-Qaeda and both groups' branches increased their focus on staging mass-casualty attacks including attacks on international hotel chains in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Tunisia; other popular public locations; and the bombing of a Russian passenger plane, it added.

While IS lost significant territory in Iraq and Syria during the second half of 2015, the group made gains in Libya amid the instability there.

And in January, IS publicly announced the establishment of an affiliate, known as ISIL-Khorasan (ISIL-K), in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it said.

"At year's end, the group had focused the majority of its attacks against Afghan government and civilian targets, although the group has also claimed a small number of attacks in Pakistan's settled areas.

"ISIL-K gained a small foothold in southern Nangarhar province in Afghanistan, but was significantly challenged by the Afghan government, Coalition Forces, and the Taliban, and had little support among the region's population," the State Department said.

<http://www.dnaindia.com/>

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